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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
SHARON ARMSTRONG: Good morning. My name is Sharon
Armstrong. I'm the Executive Symposium Editor of the Michigan
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review. I'd like to welcome
you to the University of Michigan Law School, and thank you for being
with us today.
The Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review be-
gan planning this Symposium about a year ago. At that time, the
Supreme Court hadn't yet handed down its decision in MGM v Grokster,
a case in which the entertainment industries sued yet another peer-to-
peer file-sharing network.
After following the case as it wound its way up the courts, discuss-
ing the case in our classes, and learning about how Grokster's
technology differed from its predecessors, we knew that whatever the
Supreme Court decided, the Grokster case would have a significant im-
pact not only on copyright law, but also on the people who use and
create technologies that interact with copyrighted material.
We have a very distinguished panel of experts in copyright technol-
ogy here with us today to explore many of these issues. They've traveled
from across the country and I'd like to extend another very special wel-
come for being with us.
Now I'd like to introduce the Dean of the University of Michigan
Law School, Evan Caminker.
[Applause]
DEAN EVAN CAMINKER: Good morning. In addition to being
the Dean, I'm the father of a three-month-old baby, and so those of you
who are parents or have had young children know that this is a period of
time in which in the wee hours of the morning I am up and spending
248 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 13:247
many, many, hours pacing back and forth in the family room with a little
infant on my shoulder, and there is one and only one thing that has kept
me sane during the last three months, and that is TiVo.
[Audience laughter]
I am now a big fan of the digital revolution in technology. TiVo al-
lows me to actually watch the entire session of March Madness,
including this morning watching the last three minutes of the UCLA
game last night 22 times.
[Audience laughter]
And I have to admit it, I had to keep waking my daughter up be-
cause, of course, the second she goes to sleep, I'm supposed to go to
sleep, and I'm saying "No, no, you're not going to sleep yet."
[Audience laughter]
But it does remind me at this point in time about how so many things
have changed in our world with respect to the presentation and articula-
tion of ideas that come to us in a digitized form and as there is this
continuing revolution in technology, as we all know, there will be a con-
tinuing butting of heads between existing legal forms and these new
diverging technologies. And that's why it's really exciting today to have
such a wonderful conference to look at this intersection between the
revolution of digital technology and what I think will be a revolution in
copyright law.
I want to second the general welcoming on behalf of the Michigan
Law School to all of the wonderful participants in this conference. I'm
particularly pleased that not only do we have distinguished academic
guests, but we have distinguished guests from the world of law and the
world of policy. In some cases, we have individuals who actually inhabit
two or three of those worlds. I think it's going to be a nice mixture for
those of you in the audience to see the interplay between the academic
side and the legal and policy side.
Frankly, I also would like to start with a thank you to the Michigan
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review. Obviously, the stu-
dents have worked incredibly hard over the last year to put together this
wonderful set of panelists, this wonderful day for all of you. So, please
join me in congratulating and thanking them.
[Applause]
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PANEL I
GROKSTER AND ITS AFTERMATH
KATE GUSMER: Now we're going to start our first panel. The
panel is Grokster and Its Aftermath, and the panel is going to be moder-
ated by Professor Margaret Jane Radin.
Professor Radin is the William Benjamin Scott and Luna M. Scott
Professor of Law at Stanford University. During the 2004-2005 school
year, she was a visiting professor at the University of Michigan Law
School. In the fall she was visiting at Boalt Hall at the University of
California at Berkeley and she is at NYU Law School right now.
Professor Radin is a co-author of Internet Commerce: The Emerging
Legal Framework, which is the first traditional-format case book on E-
commerce. Her research involves intellectual property, information tech-
nology and electronic commerce, and much of her current research is
focused on the role of contract in the online world. In 2002, she founded
Stanford's Center for E-commerce.
[Applause]
MARGARET JANE RADIN: Thank you so much. It is great to be
back in Ann Arbor. I'm very happy to be here. The panel we have on this
topic is the one that I would have chosen as ideal if I could've had any-
body in the universe. I'm not going to read their bios to you because I
don't want to take time away from what they have to share with you.
Instead I'm going to say "Please read the bios." We have Michael Carroll
from Villanova. He's an expert on copyright who has done important
work on music copyright. And he's missing an important basketball
game to be with us.
[Audience laughter]
We have Niva Elkin-Koren also a copyright expert, all the way from
Israel, who has done seminal work on digital property and contract. We
have Tony Reese, from Texas, whose work on the history of copyright is
uniquely impressive, and then Fred von Lohmann, from the Electronic
Frontier Foundation in Northern California, who actually litigated the
Grokster case. Please promise me you'll read their bios!
Here are a few words of introduction. In this symposium we're talk-
ing about secondary liability. Secondary liability is widespread in U.S.
law. But it's problematic because some other actor is actually performing
the proscribed act. There's accomplice liability in criminal law, with the
question of how far it should extend, and similar questions in tort; for
example, whether auto manufacturers should be liable in tort if their car
is likely to run off the road and hit somebody. There's the question of
whether gun manufacturers should be liable if their guns are not as safe
as people think they should be or whether they are primarily used by
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gangs and the gun manufacturers know that. Secondary liability in copy-
right law refers to situations where an actor is held liable for
infringement even though that actor did not perform the infringement.
Secondary liability does rest upon a direct infringement being found-
that is, someone did perform an infringement, and someone else is being
held responsible.
You can see that secondary liability is both widespread and prob-
lematic. There is an important question that is now before us, which the
Grokster case puts into focus, about how far secondary liability in copy-
right does or should extend. The underlying question is whether
distribution of technology that can be used for infringement will make
the distributor of the technology secondarily liable. This is a hot issue in
copyright, but it's also present in trademark and patent law.
It's an important question especially in copyright. It is a bet-the-
company question for distributors in the digital environment, because
each and every unauthorized copy is subject to big damages. Every time
a computer does anything it makes a copy, so in these situations there are
millions of copies. And so, therefore, your company is over with if it is
held to be secondarily liable. So, as this panel will be discussing, in prac-
tice this huge risk of secondary liability is driving innovation policy.
The plaintiffs in the Grokster case, the movie industry, really wanted
to get the Sony Betamax case from the 1980's reinterpreted. The Sony
Betamax case said you can't be liable for technology alone when it is
being used for infringement by others, if your technology is "capable of
commercially ignificant" (or sometimes) "substantial" non-infringing
use. "Capable"-that's future oriented. It could be used for infringement
today, but sometime in the future it can be capable of substantial or
commercially significant non-infringing use. The plaintiffs in the Grok-
ster case wanted to change this to look only at the present; if the
technology is being used a lot for infringement now, then the distributor
should be liable.
The defendants in the Grokster case wanted Sony to be upheld and
be enforced. In the years since the Supreme Court decided the case, Sony
had been weakened, particularly in the 7th Circuit by Judge Posner in
the Aimster case, where the judge said that he was following the Su-
preme Court's decision in Sony, but instead basically followed the
dissent in that case. He said, paraphrasing, "We need to look into the
cost benefit analysis and see how bad the infringement in the present is
today." This position didn't win in the original Sony case but it is a posi-
tion that the copyright industries would rather have.
So what happened over time was that Sony had become weakened or
ambivalent. In the 7th Circuit you have one thing; in the 9th Circuit be-
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cause of Mr. von Lohmann's victory in Grokster you had another thing.
Thus, what was at issue in Grokster at the Supreme Court was whether
the Justices were going to affirm the original Sony rule, or revise it.
The numerous amicus briefs in this case, which I think are still
posted at Fred's organization, [eff.org], show this as a battle between the
content industries and the equipment manufacturing industries. Many,
many amicus briefs were filed, by big players in the technology industry
such as Intel. They were not trying to support infringers but instead try-
ing to avoid having the copyright industries be able to control what
technologies they are able to introduce. Nobody thought that these de-
fendants should win, but, the equipment manufacturers didn't want their
product design to be subject to control by the content industries. On the
other side, the content industries don't want products out there that make
it difficult to catch infringement. That is what the battle is about.
The Supreme Court in Grokster was split into three parts. There are
nine of them and it was three, three, three. As I think this panel will fur-
ther tell you, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor,
wanted to maintain Sony and said the 9th Circuit was correct. Indeed,
Justice Stevens was the original author of the Sony majority.
However, Justices Ginsburg, Rehnquist, and Kennedy do want to
adopt pretty much the original dissent in Sony, which Justice Rehnquist
was a part of. He too was consistent. And the third group, Justice Souter
who wrote the opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, say that
Sony remains in force because this case isn't about Sony. It is about ac-
tive inducement to infringe, not about facilitation of infringement by
mere distribution of technology. So, what Sony actually now means re-
mains shaky. Does it mean what the 9th Circuit says or what the 7th
Circuit says? (Neither of the above?)
I think I'll stop there and let our panel just talk.
MICHAEL W. CARROLL: Great. Thanks. So I get to lead off, and
I've just got to get onto first. I am not going to talk about Sony. I will
leave that for my fellow panelists. I am going to focus on inducement. I
want to start at a fairly high level.
Let's look at the legal and policy goals of two industries-the con-
tent industry and the technology industry-and then work through the
case. So we've been told the threat of digital technology from the con-
tent industry's perspective is that it becomes one big copying machine.
General purpose computers connected to the internet take away a sub-
stantial amount of control over distribution that was previously enjoyed.
So, their response is to try to staunch the flow of unauthorized files
flowing across the network. And the way to do that, ideally-from the
content industry's perspective-is to get to the design of these
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technologies. So what these industries are looking for is a legal theory
that will give them a legal threat over the design process. And you've
heard this and you'll hear it again all day, but that's really the big
problem with Grokster.
They also have fallback positions. If you can't control the technol-
ogy design process, then you control the process of distributing new
technologies. Finally, if that doesn't work, can you at least impose some
liability if there isn't an attempt to filter-an attempt to use the technol-
ogy once it is out there in some way that limits its capacity for infringing
use? So those are the legal and strategy goals of the copyright-dependent
industries.
By contrast, the technology industry wants maximum freedom to
base design decisions on factors such as marketability, efficiency, and
other criteria, without having to take into account the copyright indus-
tries' concerns. In the alternative, if those concerns have to be taken into
account, their strongest demand is for a clear rule. The worst case sce-
nario is fuzzy liability that can't be quantified and therefore can't be
insured against. And, as a fallback position, liability would be not based
on design choices or whether there's filtering or not, but would instead
be based on some proportionality between infringing and non-infringing
uses or some other test.
So, those were the opposing strategies going into the case. As Pro-
fessor Radin just said, I want to reiterate that the parties were looking at
this based on two doctrinal tools: contributory infringement and vicari-
ous liability. That was the framework in which the case was presented.
Contributory infringement is fault-based liability. It had grown up in
the lower courts as requiring some proof of knowledge of infringing use
and participation in the infringing use. It's important that in the Sony
decision, the Supreme Court mushed together contributory infringement
and vicarious liability. It did not separate a fault-based and a strict liabil-
ity regime. So from the Supreme Court's perspective, it was not bound
by its own precedent with respect to the theories of liability analyzed by
the Ninth Circuit.
The lower courts though, in going through the common law process,
had created doctrinal rules, and these had started to ossify a little bit. So
the evidence required for contributory liability in the lower courts was
some form of knowledge about direct infringement and some form of
participation in the infringing acts. We saw the lower courts relaxing the
requirements to meet both of these elements under contributory in-
fringement. Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, a defendant needed
to have control over the direct infringer and receive a direct financial
benefit from the infringing activity. And, we saw the courts relaxing the
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requirements, so the measure of control could be a user agreement that
says, "We can kick you off if we want." And, a direct financial benefit
could include an indirect financial benefit, in fact.
The Supreme Court had not fashioned either of these doctrinal for-
mulations of secondary liability, and in fact, I think the Court in Grokster
reformulated both of these. So one of the legacies of Grokster will de-
pend upon how seriously the lower courts take the Court's restatement of
these doctrines. In the Supreme Court's words, contributory liability is
now not based on knowledge, but on intent. So fault-based liability is
now more directly proven by showing intent and contributory liability is
intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement. Apparently,
one reading of that is that there has to now be a tighter nexus between
the secondary infringer and the primary infringer.
And, to my mind, even more important is the Court's reformulation
of vicarious liability. It is questionable now whether secondary liability
can be strict because, according to the Court, vicarious liability is now
phrased as profiting from direct infringement, while declining to exercise
a fight to stop or limit it. Well, declining to exercise a right presumes
perhaps a level of knowledge about the infringing activity, and therefore,
it's not clear that there can be strict liability, although the prior case law
has said knowledge was not required. So that is sort of a doctrinal hook
that can be developed in a variety of ways. But now let's focus on what
the Court did.
So that was a quick intro into inducement, which is now a new
branch of contributory liability. It's got three elements. You are an in-
ducer if you (1) distribute a device (2) with the object of promoting an
infringing use (3) with the clear expression of promoting infringement or
taking affirmative steps to promote infringement. Okay?
Now that sounds like a pretty limited source of liability, and a lot of
the commentators have read the opinion that way. But in the common
law, you can't just take the legislative part of the decision-the an-
nouncement of the rule-you then have to look at how it is applied.
When the court applies this rule to the facts, it says there are three
pieces of evidence that show that there is inducement here. First, Grok-
ster targeted a known source of infringement, that is, former Napster
users. Then there was no attempt to develop filtering tools. Now wait a
minute. Where did that come from? This statement is followed by foot-
note 12. I think from now on, Grokster discussions will talk of footnote
12 in the way that constitutional lawyers talk about footnote 4. Footnote
12 says, "But failure to develop filters by itself does not subject you to
liability."
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So, the court seems to be saying on the one hand failure to filter in
this case is inducement, but this does not announce a general rule that
failure to filter is evidence of inducement. Lastly, the defendants' soft-
ware depends on scale and where infringing use is an important part of
the scale for the business model that is evidence of inducement. So, it is
not clear how those three pieces of evidence relate to the standard that
was just announced. And I think that this disconnect sets the legacy of
this inducement standard up for further development. And there's some-
thing in it for both sides.
My prediction is that the Court will have the experience that it had in
trademark law and that it is having in patent law, where it thinks it's
crafting a carefully balanced rule. It then sees the way that aggressive
parties push that rule to its limits and then the Court is forced to revisit
the rule.
So inducement now. Here's the narrow reading that the technology
industry is likely to push for. Then I'll give you the broad reading and
I'll leave it with the message that the battle to control the destiny of in-
ducement liability is on. The narrow reading is that intent is now the
name of the game. Knowledge of infringing activity by itself won't get
you there and evidence of intentional acts to promote infringement is
necessary to impose liability. And that is a more demanding standard that
was previously required under contributory infringement. As long as
your marketing materials don't show that kind of intent-as long as you
don't take other affirmative steps-even with a sort of nudge and a wink,
then one can avoid inducement liability.
So under this reading some of the first reactions were that this case
is essentially limited to its facts because the Court punted on the Sony
rule and the state of the law of secondary liability, is otherwise as it was.
As I mentioned, I do think that the court intended to reign in the scope of
the doctrines of contributory infringement and secondary liability as in-
terpreted in the Ninth Circuit. I do think the intent was to shift emphasis
away from the vicarious liability strain of strict liability that the 9th Cir-
cuit had developed, and to move to a fault-based regime, and to admit
having a fairly demanding standard for what evidence would be evidence
of fault.
I want to make sure we understand that although the Court was split
into groups of three, Justice Souter's opinion was a unanimous opinion.
So the unanimous court signed onto a statement that said, "We are, of
course, mindful of the need to keep from trenching on regular commerce
or discouraging the development of technologies with lawful and unlaw-
ful potential."
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There is a need not to discourage dual-use technologies. It is a public
policy that nine justices of the court signed onto. Dual-use technologies
are an affirmative good that ought to be developed. All right? That point
is likely to get lost in the shuffle unless the technology industries can
develop it in litigation. Evidence that this is likely to happen is what the
Grokster commentary has already found.
In contrast, I think that the legal strategy of the content industries
will be to turn the inducement standard into the revision of the Sony
standard they wanted. And I've got evidence for this in an article co-
written by Professor Jane Ginsburg which essentially lays out the road
map for how you do that. She walks through the Grokster opinion and
suggests that the filtering requirement could in fact be drawn from the
Grokster opinion and could be an affirmative requirement and the ab-
sence of filtering could serve as evidence of intent as a general matter.
Moreover, because intent is a slippery standard, I think the first strat-
egy of the copyright-dependent industries will be to drive intent all the
way into the design process because that process involves intentional
acts. Can you prove that the technologists had a choice about whether to
make the technology capable of filtering? Did they have a choice to
build an opening for a plug-in that would limit the use of the technol-
ogy? Did they choose not to develop that plug-in? So although the intent
element, I believe, was introduced to limit the scope of secondary liabil-
ity-because there are intentional acts back at the beginning of the
process-the intent standard opens the possibility that the inducement
standard can be driven all the way back into product design. If its intent
does not cover product design decisions, then use of the technology and
the choice not to filter will be the next argument over relevant evidence
of intent.
I don't think the court intended that result. I think some of the lower
courts will accept the content industries' interpretation, however, and I
think the Supreme Court will have to come back and clarify that it really
was trying to reign in the scope of secondary liability. But it is a com-
mon law process and I think it's game on. And whoever can develop the
better record, the better cases, and deliver the better lawyering will win
the struggle over the legacy of the inducement standard.
With that, I'll pass it off.
MARGARET JANE RADIN: Thank you. Professor Elkin-Koren.
NIVA ELKIN-KOREN: The optimism of some commentators who
thought that Grokster, at the end of the day, was good news for the inter-
net industry relates to the fact that the Supreme Court in Grokster did not
overturn Sony. The Court, instead, introduced inducement as a basis for
liability. What I'd like to do today is to examine this shift from Sony to
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Grokster, from the substantial non-infringing use rule to the inducement
doctrine, and to question whether it is indeed neutral on issues related to
innovation.
In Sony, the Supreme Court established the fundamental framework
for protecting copyrights in a dynamic technological environment. It
sought to strike a balance between the demands of copyright holders for
effective protection and the rights of others to freely engage in innova-
tion and commerce. The Court held that a supplier of means that enable
infringement could be held liable unless the supplied device has substan-
tial non-infringing use.
The substantial non-infringing use defense was considered a key for
keeping the courts outside the design room so that the law will not inter-
fere with the freedom to innovate and would not stifle the progress. But
the content industry felt that Sony no longer serves the interests of copy-
right holders, especially in light of increasing piracy and a growing
difficulty to enforce copyright against individual infringers. Device
manufacturers, they argued, should not stay clear of liability. If they en-
able infringement they should actively engage in preventive efforts.
Copyright owners, therefore, asked the Supreme Court to limit the Sony
exception.
In Grokster, the Supreme Court recognized that Sony secured some
breathing room for innovation. Therefore, rather than overturning Sony,
the Court opted for a new theory of liability-the inducement theory.
Inducement, as defined by the Court in Grokster, requires 1) the dis-
tribution of a device suitable for infringing use; 2) actual infringement
by the recipients of the device; and 3) intent to bring about infringement.
Presumably, this new standard left the Sony rule untouched. It shifted
attention from research and development related to new technologies, to
commercial practices and intentions. What makes inducement so attractive
to the courts is that it appears to have nothing to do with the technology
itself. It is only the intention of those who use it that matters. The court
could learn about this intention by examining market activities, promotion
materials, and business models. If those reflect an intention to induce in-
fringing activity, then defendants would be held liable, and the court
would be exempted from having to balance copyright interest and freedom
to innovate.
In my opinion, Grokster could, in fact, carry profound consequences
for design and innovation.
First, inducement doctrine adds another layer of liability. It elevates
the legal exposure for those engaged in designing new technologies. So
now developers must consider legal exposure under contributory in-
fringement, vicarious liability, as well as inducement.
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Also, inducement doctrine does not stand on its own grounds. The
elements of liability under inducement overlap with those required under
contributory infringement and vicarious liability. Intent could be estab-
lished by "gains that increase the more software is being used," which is
one of the elements necessary to establish vicarious liability.
Inducement also requires supplying devices that would enable in-
fringement which is one of the elements necessary for contributory
liability. In fact, inducement repackages the same elements, only this
time without the Sony non-infringing use defense. The same behavior
that was considered legitimate under the Sony rule could now be unlaw-
ful.
The most important consequence of inducement doctrine for design
has to do with intent as constructed by the Court in Grokster. The Court
held that inducement requires the showing of intention to bring about
infringement. The Court listed three types of evidence to support its find-
ing of "unlawful intent." One type of evidence was aiming to satisfy a
known source of demand for copyright. For instance, targeting former
Napster users or naming Grokster after Napster was held liable for copy-
right infringement. A second evidence of intent was a business model:
the more people use the software, the higher were the gains. Finally the
Court found evidence of intent in the failure to develop filtering tools.
The court held that Grokster failed to develop preventive mecha-
nisms against infringements and this failure shows its "intentional
facilitation" of the infringements committed by its users.
This interpretation of inducement assumes an affirmative duty to de-
velop the tools that would diminish infringement. Under Grokster,
developers of technologies which are capable of non-infringing use
could be expected to filter out infringing behavior.
The famous footnote 12 does not help much to limit the duty to fil-
ter. In footnote 12 the Court tells us that failing to actively prevent
infringement would be insufficient for contributory liability. But this
tells us nothing about inducement, right? Also, since other elements of
inducement are relatively easy to establish, the stipulation in footnote 12
might not relieve designers of potential liability arising from the duty to
filter.
The result is abandoning the Sony defense and requiring developers
to cater the enforcement needs of copyright owners. In this sense, Grok-
ster does follow, in my opinion, the 7th Circuit holding in Aimster which
established a normative framework for determining the duty to filter.
Here is how Judge Posner defines the circumstance under which a devel-
oper would be subject to a duty to implement preventive measures, "To
avoid liability as contributory infringer the provider of the service must
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show that it would have been disproportionately costly for him to elimi-
nate, or at least reduce substantially the infringing uses." This is the good
old least cost avoider rule: One should be held liable for hardship that
she could prevent in a cost effective way.
What is wrong with that?
The first problem is analytic: Applying the least cost avoider ap-
proach in a dynamic technological marketplace leads to circular
reasoning. We assume that parties should be held liable if they failed to
employ cost effective measures. Yet, the cost and availability of such
measures are themselves the result of a duty to employ certain measures.
Liability rules could affect incentives to invest in research and develop-
ment to produce specific technological solutions. If we hold suppliers
liable for failure to implement preventive measures against hacking,
we're likely to induce greater investments in efforts to develop such
measures. This is likely to make such filtering available sooner and at
lower cost. Therefore, the cost and availability of technologies cannot be
considered exogenous in the liability analysis.
But the question is, of course, whether we want to encourage this
type of technological development in the first place.
The Grokster interpretation of inducement invites legal intervention
in shaping designs related to the standards. It is arguable that the Su-
preme Court in Grokster simply failed to stay away from design
considerations, but still kept Sony untouched, and therefore, it really
changed nothing in the status quo.
My concern is that the consequences of the duty to filter could be
more profound. That has to do with the different assumptions underlying
the duty to filter on the one hand and the Sony safe harbor defense on the
other hand. The substantial non-infringing use defense assumed that it is
impossible to tell infringing from non-infringing behavior, and therefore,
that it is not justifiable to outlaw technologies simply because they enable
infringement. A duty to filter, by contrast, assumes that distinguishing law-
ful and unlawful uses could be made possible.
A second issue is duration and cost. The substantial non-infringing
use defense provided incentives at an early stage of the design. A duty to
filter is enduring, and therefore, more costly. It requires suppliers to keep
updating their system against new challenging efforts to hack and enable
copying. You may recall the continuing effort by Napster to comply with
the temporary injunction issued by the district court.
The last point has to do with design. The signals provided by the
Sony defense encouraged the development of neutral platforms that
could be used for many purposes in different ways. Consider, for in-
stance, the shift from Napster's music service, the first generation of
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peer-to-peer design, to the second and third generation of peer-to-peer
networks. Sony also provided incentives to design systems that would
allow more choice of the active users and would reduce central manage-
ment and control.
A duty to filter may provide incentives for central management that
would reduce the risk of infringement. Take ISP's for instance. Under
Grokster, internet service providers could be held liable for infringing
peer-to-peer traffic. First, they provide the infrastructure for infringing
use by facilitating peer-to-peer applications on their network. Second,
peer-to-peer is considered to a killer application which boosted ISP's
revenues by increasing demand for broadband services.
Finally, intention could be learned from the failure of ISP's to im-
plement filtering tools especially in broadband services. This potential
for liability could affect incentives to develop solutions that would allow
monitoring and filtering of peer-to-peer traffic, such as caching that is
now emerging as a technical solution for managing peer-to-peer traffic.
Another example of how a duty to filter may affect design is at-
tempts of file sharing networks such as eDonkey to follow iMesh and
build a service that filters out unauthorized content.
To conclude, if we care about design we should worry about
Grokster. If we believe, as I do, that the virtues of digital networks are
vested in their decentralized nature which empowers end-users and
minimizes control over the distribution of content, we should be con-
cerned about the ramifications of Grokster.
MARGARET JANE RADIN: Thank you. Professor Reese.
R. ANTHONY REESE: Thank you. I think we're going to slightly
shift gears now at this side of the panel away from the inducement aspect
of Grokster. I want to think about one aspect of the Grokster aftermath,
which is the avoidance by the Grokster court of the further development
of Sony.
I want to adopt, at least for my purposes this morning, the reading of
Grokster as saying inducement is a separate basis for liability, leaving
undisturbed the existing set of standards under Sony. I want to consider a
little bit the situation of the dual-use device maker who avoids induce-
ment-who doesn't actively promote or do any of the express, overt acts
that clearly constitute inducement under Grokster (putting aside the
question of whether you can go behind that as the previous panelists
have suggested).
So Grokster largely leaves the Sony standard in place with no further
clarification of exactly what test a dual-use device has to satisfy in order
to escape liability. Sony, of course, said the standard was that the device
would be okay if it was "capable of substantial noninfringing uses" or
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"commercially significant" non-infringing use. And Grokster, in my
opinion, leaves that standard in place and requires us to keep thinking
about what the substantial non-infringing use standard means. And in
particular, this morning I'm going to talk a little bit about the temporal
aspect of this standard. It is often thought of, I think, as a static concept,
but I think it has a dynamic dimension that is worth considering.
So first I want to look at the dynamic element of what is a non-
infringing use and then to think a little bit about whether there's a tem-
poral aspect with respect to what "capable" of non-infringing use means.
I'm going to leave aside the question of what is substantial or what is
commercially significant.
First with respect to non-infringing use, the Sony case made it clear
there are at least two primary categories of non-infringing uses of a de-
vice that are relevant: uses that are a fair use under the statute, and uses
that are authorized-particularly uses that are authorized by the copy-
right owner.
So first, fair use. Here, I think we're becoming much more aware of
the fact that there is a dynamic aspect to fair use and what's fair can
change over time. We have a quite recent example in the form of the dis-
trict court decision in the Perfect 10 v. Google case, which is about
whether or not producing and showing thumbnail images as part of an
image search engine constituted fair use. That recent district court case
decided that because there was now a market for displaying small, low-
resolution pictures on your cell phone and for selling people those pic-
tures to put on their cell phones, the display by search engines of
thumbnail images led to a finding of potential harm to the copyright
owner's market-the market for tiny thumbnail images to be
downloaded to your cell phone. And that weighed against a finding of
fair use on behalf of the search engine. That decision stands in sharp
contrast to a decision from only a few years earlier in which the 9th Cir-
cuit had said, "Well, there's really no real market for tiny little reduced
resolution thumbnail images. So there's no real harm to the market in
search engines displaying those images."
So clearly, markets can change over time. User behavior can change
over time, and what is fair will change over time. Sony itself, I think,
presents us with an example of this-and one that Dean Caminker with
his new-found love for TiVo may not be happy about. The finding in
Sony that seventy-five percent of surveyed users who time-shifted with
their Betamaxes did not skip the advertising when they viewed the re-
corded program seems to be important to the Court's conclusion that
time-shifting was a fair use.
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When I teach the case, I survey my classes and I get a quite higher
percentage than twenty-five percent who fast forward through the ads-I
think, in large part, because at the time the survey was done, most Be-
tamaxes did not have a remote control. So does the provision of a remote
control, by changing the viewing habits, change whether or not time-
shifting constitutes fair use?
This dynamic element of fair use, I think, means that today's fair use
could be tomorrow's infringing use, thereby possibly reducing over time
the quantity of non-infringing use that could be counted toward whatever
is substantial or commercially significant use in evaluating liability for
supplying a dual-use device.
A second set of non-infringing uses that comes out of Sony is a set of
authorized uses, things that the copyright owner has allowed. The most
famous example from the Sony case is Mr. Rogers and the evidence that
Mr. Rogers was quite happy to have people tape Mr Rogers' Neighbor-
hood so they could watch it at a time appropriate for their kids. (It's great
to teach the case in law school-how often do we get to talk about Mr.
Rogers in the context of a Supreme Court decision)?
But the amount of authorization by copyright owners can obviously
change over time as well. Again, we have an example directly from the
Grokster case. Some of you may remember the lawyer for the recording
industry saying in oral argument in the Grokster case that his clients-
the recording industry-had publicly stated on their website that, of
course, it was okay to take a CD that you owned and rip the songs on
that CD onto your iPod for your personal use.
Recently, though, the RIAA, in a filing with the Copyright Office,
indicated that yes, that was what they had said, but they didn't mean to
say that that was fair use, only that it was authorized use by the re-
cording companies, suggesting that the recording companies could
tomorrow say, "We actually are not authorizing you anymore to rip
songs from your CDs and put them on your iPods."
So authorization can change over time as well. But here I think it is
possible to detect a general trend toward more authorized uses that
would count on the non-infringing use side under the Sony test. In Sony,
of course, we're dealing with broadcast television where we've got a
relatively small number of copyright owners whose authorization is rele-
vant, and who generally focus on commercial exploitation. But that has
changed.
Let me ask you this. Raise your hand if you are a copyright owner.
Okay-not very many hands. You're selling yourselves short. I'm quite
confident that since 1.989 all of you have fixed in a tangible medium of
expression some minimally creative work of authorship, and you are,
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therefore, a copyright owner, because copyright law has moved from an
opt-in system where copyright owners were people who sought protec-
tion, to an automatic system where every creator automatically owns
copyright.
As a result, we have a lot more copyright owners out there today
than we did at the time of Sony. And because of technological advances,
we have copyright owners who can produce pretty much every kind of
copyrighted work. You could always have lots of people who produce
literary manuscripts or musical compositions-all you really needed was
a pen and pencil. But with today's technology you've got lots of people
who can produce motion pictures and sound recordings and other kinds
of elaborate works of authorship that used to be the province of the
copyright industries.
Many of these new copyright owners-I suspect many of you who
didn't raise your hands, and some of you who did-have much less in-
terest in the commercial exploitation of their works than the traditional
copyright owners did. They also--due to technologies like digital net-
works-have far more accessible means today to make those works
available to the public at large. And, most importantly in thinking about
authorized uses under the Sony test, they now have many more easy
ways to indicate to the public their authorization that people can do
many things with their works. I'm thinking specifically here about
mechanisms like the Creative Commons licenses that allow people to
release copyrighted works of authorship with express indication of per-
mission for people to engage in lots of uses of those works. And we have
millions and millions of works released under those licenses.
As a result of all of these trends, at least for general purpose digital
devices, there's now a lot of copyrighted content out there for which the
use on those devices is authorized by the copyright owner, and therefore,
relevant in the non-infringing use analysis under Sony. Some channels of
dissemination, of course, are not very open to this. There's still broadcast
and cable TV, and broadcast and satellite radio, where you don't have a
lot of small author-produced and distributed content becoming available.
So if you're a technology producer who's creating a device that interacts
specifically with a cable TV box or a satellite radio receiver, all of this
additional authorized material may not help you very much if you're
analyzing liability under the Sony test. But generally, I think there's been
a shift since Sony to more authorization out there that can count as non-
infringing use.
So that may be kind of hopeful about the non-infringing use possi-
bilities and how they're changing over time. But now, having thought
about what non-infringing uses are out there, I want to switch to thinking
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about the question of how we figure out whether a device is "capable" of
substantial or commercially significant non-infringing use.
I started off by saying the Court hadn't really given us any clarifica-
tion of Sony in the Grokster case. That is true of the Court, but of course,
four justices who still remain on the court did clarify their views about
Sony-in Justice Ginsburg's and Justice Breyer's concurrences-and
again I think these concurrences can be read to suggest a dynamic view
of "capable of substantial non-infringing use" that changes over time.
Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg disagree about a lot in their con-
curring opinions, but while Justice Breyer seems to do various things at
various places, it's possible, I think, to read the opinions as agreeing
about what "capable of substantial non-infringing use" means.
Both opinions don't treat that question as a question about what uses
the device has the capacity to make. They don't simply ask "What could
this technology do?" Instead, they both seem to treat this question-the
"capability" question-as a question of what uses a device can be shown
to be likely to be actually used for in the future. Not just that it's capable
of it, but will it likely be used in that way. They both have language that
suggests the real question here is whether there is a reasonable prospect,
or plausible likelihood, that these substantial non-infringing uses will
develop over time. Not just can the device do them, but will they be
adopted?
So, I think, they're essentially saying you're okay under the Sony
standard if your device is widely used for legitimate non-objectionable
purposes-language from Sony-or is reasonably likely to become so
used in the future. And that view of "capable of substantial non-
infringing use" as being about future adoption rather than the device's
capacity has, I think, at least two consequences.
One, it makes me less optimistic about all this stuff that's out there
that's been authorized for use as we just discussed because the question
isn't just how many authorized uses are possible. The question is how
many authorized uses are made or will be likely to be made in the future.
So having a lot of content available under Creative Commons licenses
isn't enough if people don't actually use the content that's available un-
der that approach.
The other thing that it suggests, which I think is more worrisome, is
that the answer to the question of whether a device is capable of substan-
tial non-infringing use can change over time, even if what counts as non-
infringing use doesn't change, even if there's no difference in what is fair
use, and there's no change in the amount of authorization.
It seems to me that both Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg suggest
that you could have a case where a court today says, "The distributor of
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this device can't be held liable because there's a reasonable prospect of
uptake by users of the device of authorized uses or fair uses of the
work," and, that with respect to the same technology 10 years later--or
20 years later, depending on what the timeframe is-a court might say,
"Well, that uptake hasn't happened. There could've been a lot of author-
ized and fair uses of this device, but it still looks like ninety percent,
eighty percent of the use is for infringing uses. And therefore, although it
was capable of substantial non-infringing use, it hasn't lived up to that
capability. Nothing has changed to make us think it's likely to live up to
that possibility in the next few years, and therefore, the distributor of that
technology is now liable by distributing it for any infringing uses com-
mitted by the users."
So, I think that the aftermath of Grokster for the Sony standard, un-
derstood separately from the inducement standard, is going to potentially
create (or preserve) problems for the courts and technology developers.
This temporal dimension of how we figure out whether a device is capa-
ble of substantial non-infringing use is one that's going to bedevil us in
future cases and the concurring opinions Grokster have only highlighted
the problem.
MARGARET JANE RADIN: Thank you. Professor-Professor?
No.
FRED VON LOHMANN: No. No.
MARGARET JANE RADIN: Not a professor. The non-professor
Fred von Lohmann.
FRED VON LOHMANN: Yes, the non-professor. Because I'm
speaking here to an audience of principally attorneys and people who
will someday be attorneys, I feel confident that I can let on a little secret
to this group here. As a practicing lawyer, you'll come to discover very
quickly that practicing lawyers view litigation very differently from their
clients.
And so, I remember quite vividly in the fall of 2001 hearing that a
group of some thirty entertainment companies had brought a lawsuit
against Streamcast, Grokster, and the makers of Kazaa. My first thought
was this is going to be a blockbuster case. It's going to be the case that
will test the scope of the Sony Betamax doctrine and will likely shape the
scope of secondary liability in copyrighting for some time to come.
My second thought was that I hoped to be involved as counsel in that
case. That worked out. I was counsel in that case. We at EFF represented
Streamcast, one of the two defendants that were involved in the Supreme
Court opinion.
We had very capable co-counsel representing Streamcast with us and
referred our co-defendants at Grokster to excellent counsel, as well. We
Fall 2006] 21s Century Copyright Law in the Digital Domain 265
thought it wouldn't be prudent to represent all the defendants given the
differences between them. And so they, asked me for referrals for other
counsel and I recall I referred Grokster to Michael Page who represented
them throughout this proceeding. Later on I talked to Mike about this,
and he admitted that as soon as he took that phone call, the first thing in
his mind was-"We're going to the Supreme Court baby."
[Audience laughter]
I have to admit, I knew it would be an important case. I had no
thought that it would go all the way to the Supreme Court. I mean, I
thought it was possible it could go to the Court, but that certainly wasn't
something I was taking for granted. Mike said he knew the moment he
picked up the phone that we were going all the way. Now I have no way
of disproving him because I didn't ask when I first spoke to him.
But let me tell you, from the client's perspective when you get sued
by twenty-nine or thirty entertainment companies, the first thing in your
mind isn't "Cool!"
[Audience laughter]
So let me walk through what I think that the post-Grokster world looks
like from a client's perspective, because frankly, as attorneys, that will be
the perspective you'll have to deal with on a regular basis in your practice.
So let me give you a hypothetical, and this hypothetical is not en-
tirely hypothetical-that you'll recognize bits and pieces of it as having
been drawn from real life-but let's imagine you represent a technology
company that develops innovative technology and one of their products
is a new digital mass storage device. It basically stores large amounts of
digital data. Sort of the next thing beyond hard drives. This new mass
storage device is particularly optimized for the storage and playback of
digital video. Demand for such a device can certainly be imagined, given
the increase in interest in digital videos in recent years.
So your client has developed this great new technology. It's showing
great success in the marketplace. It's selling like gangbusters and then
over the transom comes a letter from the Motion Picture Association of
America. The letter says, "Dear Storage Co. It has come to our attention
that your technology is being used principally for infringement of our
copyrights. We know this because we have commissioned surveys in the
field of your customers. Please find attached as Exhibit A to this letter
the results of said survey, including responses from some 3,000 or 4,000
of your actual customers illustrating that in fact some seventy-five percent
of them are using your technology to infringe our works. Moreover, we
know that your works are being principally used for infringement because
we have found many, many reports in the press from reviewers and users
celebrating how well your product works for making unauthorized copies
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of our high-definition movies. Please find attached hereto as Exhibit B a
number of such articles, including the extensive threat of Slashdot peo-
ple saying, 'Boy, oh, boy, this is really the way that you should be
archiving your movies you've downloaded from BitTorrent."' This bit,
by the way, is the bit from real life. The number of times I've seen copy-
right owners cite Slashdot as evidence.
[Audience laughter]
It is really quite stunning for anyone who actually reads Slashdot
regularly. The MPAA letter continues, "And moreover, we believe that
there are very easy and inexpensive ways that you can modify your tech-
nology to reduce this popularity for infringing uses. Please find attached
hereto as Exhibit C a detailed description from our retained technology
experts explaining things you can do to change your technology that
would make it less useful for copyright infringement. We, for example,
think watermark detection would be a wonderful thing you could add.
Moreover, we also think in future iterations of your product, you should
include a tether whereby you can go back and update that product and
users in the event new and better forms of technology should develop
that would make your product even more resistant to infringing uses."
The term, by the way, in the movie industry field for this is "revoca-
tion." It is something that they're very serious about. The notion is that
they don't want to see products that go out the door that cannot be sub-
sequently modified. That way, if a device is cracked or otherwise altered,
the technology vendor will be able to reach out and "update" the entire
set of products in the field.
So your client comes to you. And as I said, your client is probably
not thinking to him or herself, "Cool!" The client asks, "What am I sup-
posed to do? Am I liable? What are my rights? Please advise me." So let
me talk a little bit about what that session-for which you will be charg-
ing several hundred dollars an hour-might look like. Frankly, this is I
think an echo of some of what we've heard earlier here today, I'm not
principally worried about inducement. Inducement is the least of my
concerns advising a client because I actually think I know pretty well
how to advise a client on inducement.
If that client has been wise and has secured my counsel throughout
the process of developing and launching the product, that client will al-
ready have been careful not to say anything stupid in advertising
material-not to say anything stupid in instructions or in customer ... or
in other material, and hopefully, that client will have been careful to keep
their customer service representatives on a very tight leash so that when
the archives of e-mails from customer service to your customers comes
out, there won't be anything in there that will be incriminating.
Fall 2006] 215' Century Copyright Law in the Digital Domain 267
In fact, I've often thought that for a number of technology compa-
nies giving up customer service entirely may, in fact, be a sensible thing
to do.
[Audience laughter]
After all, these days as a user of new technology devices, I get much
better support from user forums than I do from companies anyway. So
why not just make that the policy?
So inducement doesn't worry me so much because that portion can
be contained. And here actually, I have to somewhat disagree with Pro-
fessor Elkin-Koren and with some others who have suggested that intent
is so scary because it's so amorphous. There is always evidence of intent.
My answer to that is, "Of course there is." I'm not going to urge you to
try to win on the inducement claim on intent, right? You're screwed,
right? You're never going to get out on summary judgment on an intent
question.
The way you're going to get out is by demonstrating that you took
no affirmative acts to encourage or induce infringement. You didn't actu-
ally communicate a message to anyone that encouraged them to infringe.
That's something that as a company you can and should be able to con-
trol. So inducement worries me not so much, especially if the company's
been well-advised from the outset.
Well, now, what about contributory and vicarious liability? What do
we do about that? Tony has given a very able description of the substan-
tial non-infringing use standards. I agree with folks who have said the
Supreme Court's opinion certainly doesn't give us crystal-clear guid-
ance.
So my question then is "Well, what do you do on that? How do you
win on Betamax?" Well, I think this client may have some relatively
good stories to tell about non-infringing uses. I mean, clearly, a large
capacity digital storage technology just like hard drives, just like floppy
disks, and blank DVD's, and all the other storage technologies that have
come before is certainly capable of substantial non-infringing uses:
backing up files, backing up your home movies.
One can imagine there are probably many actual instances of non-
infringing uses. I am going to say to my client, "We need to develop evi-
dence and emphasize the authorized uses of this technology," and I'm
not going to want to go into court and say, "It's a fair use for you to
make backups of your DVD's on this technology, right?" I don't want to
have that argument in court. I want to say, instead, "People have lots of
home movies. They are backing up their home movies with this prod-
uct." Clearly, not infringement. I don't have to have a fair use debate.
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The authorized uses are the easy ones and the ones that are going to be
clearest for you as a client.
So, the question then becomes, well, what is substantial? What does
that mean? The MPAA in the hypothetical cease and desist letter described
a moment ago, have obviously come forward with what they hope will be
evidence that the overwhelming use of your product is for infringement. If
they come forward with that evidence, does that get them past summary
judgment? Because for you as a small startup company, frankly, whether
you win or lose is only distantly relevant. What's relevant is: can the
copyright industries drag you through millions of dollars of litigation
before you can obtain an answer? They could starve you to death for
funding, for example, if you're a venture-funded company, long before
you actually get to the final answer.
I always remind people that there has still never been a final judg-
ment in a peer-to-peer file sharing case involving technology. Napster
was [a] a preliminary injunction case. They disappeared before final
judgment was entered. Aimster, was the same-a preliminary injunction
effectively ended the matter. And even in the Grokster case, we have a
situation where it was a partial summary judgment-no final judgments.
These are very expensive cases to litigate, and the expenses often drive
companies out of business before a court is able to render a final judg-
ment. We'll never know if Napster or Aimster might have prevailed after
a trial.
So is the evidence contained in our hypothetical MPAA letter
enough to get plaintiffs past summary judgment? The survey, the report-
ing from Slashdot and other news sources? And how much infringing
use is too much? They came forward with a survey that said seventy-five
percent of the users surveyed were using it for non-infringing activi-
ties-presumably making copies of movies they were not authorized to
make copies of. Is that enough? I don't know, how to advise my client on
that issue. I would say it's uncertain. We have a three-three-three split in
the Grokster case. We have a 7th Circuit ruling. The law is unclear.
Vicarious liability, which has been spoken about least so far today, in
my view is actually the single most dangerous and frightening doctrine
in secondary liability, precisely because that is the theory that the enter-
tainment industries have consistently argued creates a duty to redesign
your product. It hasn't been through inducement. In the Grokster case
from day one, the copyright industries said that the ability to have de-
signed the technology differently should be viewed as satisfying the
"right and ability to control" element of vicarious infringement. This
stemmed from the irrebuttable fact that P2P software vendors were not
able to actually control the activities of end-users, any more than Xerox
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can control how its machines are used. The entertainment industry ulti-
mately admitted that this P2P technology does not give you the ability to
control how people use it.
So their answer to that was, "Yes, but the reason you can't control
what people do with your technology is because you made a deliberate
design decision to create a system where you could not control what the
user is doing." So the argument is that if you could've designed your prod-
uct to have control over your users and you failed to do so, you should be
deemed to have control of your users.
Where does that leave our hypothetical Storage Co. client? Could the
client have designed its product so that it could have asserted more control
over what its users did with the device? Well, sure, it could have, right?
What realm of possible design options is a court going to look at? You
could have designed a very different product. instead of having people
have a storage device that sits on their desk, you could've stored a system
that stored all that data in a server somewhere on the internet. Had you
designed that product, you would've had very good control over what your
customers were doing with your product, but of course, that wouldn't look
much like what you actually built. Will that be held against you?
My answer is, I don't know. The Supreme Court left vicarious liability
entirely unaddressed in the Grokster case. The case law below is not terri-
bly clear either. The Solicitor General's brief was kind enough to reject
this argument in a footnote. So that's good. I'll cite that if this ever comes
up again. The Solicitor General of the United States thought it was crazy.
Of course, he came out the other way on the rest of the case. But I don't
know the answer.
So here's the point where my client gets frustrated and says, "You're
telling me there are no clear answers." The next question a typical business
client will ask is, "Well, what is my downside? If you can't tell me
whether I'm going to win or lose, tell me what my maximum downside
risk is so I can try to build a business sensibly around that risk." And there
I'm going to tell my client, "Well, there are three pieces of bad news that I
think you should know about. One, statutory damages as was mentioned
earlier creates a situation where you would be liable for a minimum mone-
tary amount of roughly seven hundred dollars per work your customers
have infringed, if you're found liable."
So you pull out a pocket calculator, you run a few numbers, and you
deliver the bad news, "So you'll be liable for ... let's say you have
400,000 customers each of whom have made at least a hundred copies of
works on their very large capacity drives. You're looking at a minimum
statutory damage amount of five hundred billion dollars."
[Audience laughter]
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Let's do the math. It adds up real quickly. And on top of that, copy-
right owners have a very easy time getting injunctions. Copyright law
has a number of features that favor preliminary injunctive relief for
rights holders as witnessed by Napster and Aimster and others who
found themselves in this position. So your product could-if we go to
litigation-find itself yanked off the market within a matter of weeks
depending on the timetable, certainly, within a matter of months, de-
pending on how quickly they file for an injunction.
Now the client is getting very unhappy, and I say to them, "Oh, and
by the way, given the nature of these risks, there's no insurance policy in
the world that you can buy that will cover these risks. This is not the
kind of thing that your insurer is going to be eager to cover. Oh, and fi-
nally, in copyright law, we really don't have such a thing as the corporate
veil. So they're going to sue you in your personal capacity and come af-
ter your house and the house of each of your board of directors
personally." And by the way, in the course of this litigation, my fees are
probably--depending on the size of your company-going run about a
half-a-million dollars a month, for as many years as it takes."
[Audience laughter]
So now my client is saying probably "Okay. We need to call the guys
in Hollywood and work something out. Whatever they want, let's find a
way to give them what they want because we can't go to the mat on
this."
So that, I think, is the scary picture presented by secondary liability
in the post-Grokster world. It's not inducement that's the problem. It's
the rest of the secondary liability, in my view, that is the problem for in-
novators.
This leads to a few likely implications. First, I think you have to
think about the implications that this legal structure has for different
kinds of innovators in the market. The Supreme Court didn't know, or
perhaps didn't think, that this decision was going to restructure innova-
tion markets. You don't see a lot of that addressed in the opinion. You see
some in Breyer's concurrence, certainly, but not in the unanimous opin-
ion. You don't see very much about this.
I would suggest this new arrangement of secondary liability princi-
ples creates some very interesting incentives for innovators.
Imagine you're a very, very big company with lots of resources and
lots of money for whom a half-a-million dollars a month in litigation
costs is not such a big deal. For example, Microsoft. What are your in-
centives? Well, the problem for you is if you lose on this one product,
due to the nature of statutory damages, the odds are pretty good it'll take
the rest of your company with it. Any loss in the courtroom is the boat
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anchor that takes the whole company to the bottom. So for you as Mi-
crosoft, do you really want to bet the whole company on this one new
technology? Probably not. So you have very strong incentives to go ne-
gotiate with Hollywood. You actually have also better access to go
negotiate with rights holders, as well. When Microsoft picks up the
phone and calls the people at MGM and Disney and Universal, and
wants to sit down and talk about how we should redesign our technol-
ogy, that call will get answered almost immediately and they can afford
to have the lengthy negotiation. And, perhaps if they're thinking strategi-
cally, Microsoft may say to itself, "And that gives me an advantage over
my smaller competitors, because my large size, and privileged access to
the entertainment industries, will allow me to cut deals that the small fry
won't be able to cut." And so great, the big guys have incentives to nego-
tiate and perhaps an ability to create new barriers to entry.
On the other end of the spectrum, you have what were earlier called
the hackers. The hackers, frankly, don't care. The hackers are individual
programmers scattered throughout the world who are going to design the
technologies they think are interesting, that people want. Many of them
don't know anything about the law. Many of them who know something
about the law don't care. Their attitude is, sure fine, sue me. You can
have my 10-year-old car and my collection of outdated software, and
fine, we're done. Unless you've got a criminal claim against me, you
really don't have that much to threaten me with.
So those guys will keep innovating. You're going to see more Nap-
sters. You're going to see more DVD ripping tools. You're going to see
more of the kinds of tools that small groups of innovators can create kind
of non-commercially as a hobby.
The thing I worry about most is the guys in the middle. If you are a
small company, if you are venture-financed, and you want to build a
technology at the leading edge like the technology I describe, you are
going to have a real bad time of it because your venture capitalists are
not going to be thrilled to pony up millions of dollars to do work that
could be sued out of existence at whim of the entertainment industries.
So that's my view on that.
Now, I will note some interesting counter-examples just to point out
that life is more complicated than it first appears. I will note that BitTor-
rent managed to net eight million dollars of funding after the Grokster
case came down. Well, now that's sort of interesting. Who are those
VC's and what were they thinking? So the uncertainty regarding secon-
dary liability may not dry up all innovation among small companies. Just
because the lawyers think your risk profile looks one way doesn't neces-
sarily mean the entire venture community views things the same way.
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That being said, I think on the margins, one would imagine more reti-
cence among innovators than would've existed before. I think we have to
worry about ways in which case law like Grokster creates this distortion
in our national innovation policy.
MARGARET JANE RADIN: Thank you. If you folks are amena-
ble, perhaps we could go directly to audience participation so we can
hear what people respond to this.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: As a computer scientist, whenever I hear
people talking about filters, I cringe, and I hear that Ed Felten will be
discussing some of the technological problems with writing filters. But
let's just assume for the moment that it is impossible technically or
mathematically to write a filter to detect copyrighted material being sent
over the net.
This is the process of the law. You might talk about approximations.
Well, maybe we can capture fifty percent of it or something like that.
Where's the reader in this? That's what I want to know, the technical
reader?
[Audience laughter]
FRED VON LOHMANN: Rather than answer that question be-
cause I think it's begging for technical rigor among lawyers it sort of
answers itself, doesn't it?
[Audience laughter]
If we had to have we would've gone into computing and gotten en-
gineering degrees. But I will say this. I think the focus on filtering is far
too narrow. The legal principle that the entertainment industries are seek-
ing here, is not an obligation to filter. That the shorthand with which this
concept has been tagged.
Rather than limiting themselves to "filtering," the entertainment in-
dustries are really seeking precedents to support their view that
technology companies should have a duty-a general duty-to design
their products to minimize infringing uses to the extent reasonably pos-
sible.
So, if filtering doesn't work, then fine, let's talk about something
else. This is why I mentioned revocation and the ability to update the
products. Maybe it's not filters. Maybe it's some other mechanism that
might work better. So, from the rights holders' point of view, they're not
wedded to "filtering" or any one particular solution. They want the tech-
nology companies to solve this problem for them and pay for the
solution.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: But don't you think that there should then
be some discussion of what these things are because when you talk about
monitoring, for example... ?
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MICHAEL W. CARROLL: So, I want to make two points. One,
how to answer your question, I think, is really that the entertainment in-
dustry wants to get discovery. That is, they want to be able to use a
lawsuit to get the information about all of the choices that were made in
the design process. The rigor then would be simply what did you look at,
what could you have looked at and chose not to look at in designing
this? And, I think, Fred's exactly right. It's not really the filtering. It's
about what elements of control did you choose to build in? What ele-
ments of control did you opt not to include that you could have?
To Fred though, he said, "I'm not worried about inducement, I'm
worried about vicarious liability." I think you have to worry about in-
ducement. I think the strategy is to repackage all of the vicarious
requirements into inducement and draw with that and say, "I want dis-
covery about all your design choices because I want to see if you have
engaged in an intentional act to induce infringement."
So from the technologists' perspective, you want rigor as to whether
you made a rational choice or not, but from a business perspective, the
business doesn't want to have to give discovery. The business doesn't
want to have to litigate that question at all. The Sony rule provided a safe
harbor that the question of product design wasn't relevant to the legal
issue. And if inducement gets developed the way it might, that question
becomes relevant and then it's going to change the practice of innova-
tion.
NIVA ELKIN-KOREN: Assuming that no filter is perfect, and that
it is absolutely impossible to prevent copyright infringement by techno-
logical means, a duty to filter still matters. That is because it affects
design and cost. From a legal perspective the question is who should
bear the cost: the cost of copyright enforcement, the cost of filtering, the
cost of developing preventive measures against infringing materials?
That is similar to a duty to comply with DRM's. It does not have to be a
filter. The question is whose responsibility it is and who has to bear the
cost of implementing technological measure and keeping it updated so it
can effectively address forthcoming technological challenges. If there is
a duty to filter, regardless of whether it is feasible, then it is likely to af-
fect the type of technologies that would become available.
MARGARET JANE RADIN: Let's say one more jurisprudential
thing, too. If the doctrinal issue is could you have readily done this, and
you failed to do whatever this is, judges are not very good at figuring
that out. Occasionally you get somebody like Judge Posner who is per-
fectly willing to say judges should figure out what could have been done
and they should figure out how much it is going to cost. So they should
274 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 13:247
be economists. Although Judge Posner's perfectly willing to say courts
should do this, that's not a thing which judges are good at.
So when you're talking about rigor ... you saw a bit of it in the
Napster case. They called people to the stand and experts in this and
said, "Okay, how seriously could you have done something or other?,"
and the court was ready to give them some leeway on that, but they had
lost the case already because it made them go broke. But as Fred was
saying, that's the type of stuff that you get into if you have legal docu-
ments that make this relevant.
So the whole debate about Sony is partly driven by the fact that
many people think that you should be able to formulate a legal doctrine
that doesn't make so much of that stuff relevant. So, the dangerous thing
right now that's out there from my point of view is when you have Judge
Posner saying, "Well, I'm following Sony because I have to, because I'm
not the Supreme Court." But, he re-reads it to make that stuff relevant,
then all of a sudden, we're in that phase that you're questioning, I think.
R. ANTHONY REESE: And Judge Posner would be quite happy to
say, "Sure, fine. It's not perfectly possible. You can only filter out fifty
percent. Great. All we say in Aimster is 'could you have eliminated or
significantly reduced the amount of infringement activity?' So, sure
we'll take into account how effective it is. But if it's possible to do it at
some effective level, then you're going to have to run the cost benefit
analysis."
FRED VON LOHMANN: I don't think secondary liability in copy-
right imposes any obligation whatsoever on technology companies to
design their technology to do the job of we saying for infringement. I
don't think the inducement MGM vs. Grokster changes that for compa-
nies who don't take affirmative acts that encourage or induce
infringement.
As I said, although the entertainment industry has continued to press
the same view under vicarious liability, it has so far been rejected by
every court to have looked at the argument. So I don't want to concede
by any means that the question is simply who pays for the redesign. My
opinion is that technology companies should have no obligation under
secondary liability to do that. Now, if Congress wants to legislate a re-
gime that requires them to design a certain way, well, then obviously
that's Congress's prerogative, but I don't think it should be done via
judge-made secondary liability principles.
MICHAEL W. CARROLL: So, if I'm a business person sitting in
the audience, I have to say that I would think that there's a whole lot of
uncertainty actually about the impact of Grokster. I think quite clearly, a
difference of opinion, which may help explain why some VC's are will-
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ing to fund. Why, we haven't seen more cases yet. So none of that really
scared me so much. But what did scare me has nothing to do with Grok-
ster because my risk profile was all the stuff Fred started talking about in
terms of statutory damages and injunctive relief and personal liability. I
want to say that it seemed to me that of all those other legal issues you
can always try to find a way to win an argument one way or another. But,
when you come up with a risk profile, it's the five hundred million dol-
lars or whatever and the fact that you might take my house that's actually
really got my attention. At the end of the day, it doesn't matter how you
interpret Grokster. If you've got a series of rules that ensure enforcement
even before you actually get to the trial then I just can't take that risk,
and that's the practical reality folks.
FRED VON LOHMANN: Right after the Grokster case came out, I
wrote an article in which that was exactly the approach I took. It is criti-
cal that we consider the chilling effect that these legal norms can have on
innovation. We also made this point in our briefs to the Supreme Court,
where EFF was joined in making that point by Intel, the Business Soft-
ware Alliance, and from sixty law professors. It appeared from the oral
argument that the justices also agreed that the chilling effect on innova-
tors is a worry. Then another way to approach the problem would be to
fix the remedial structure such that it is not so thermonuclear to people
who are in this field. So, I have suggested that one good first step would
be to eliminate statutory damages for secondary liability claims. If you
can prove that I'm liable, then you also should have the proof that I did
you some harm, and maybe I'm liable for that. But that's very different
from the kind of statutory damage multiples you see in the existing re-
medial provisions of the Copyright Act.
Another place I think some sense would be in order is the ease with
which these claims can be used to pierce a corporate veil, which I fully
agree is incredibly chilling. For those who don't know, the principal in-
vestors in Napster are still being sued for Napster's activities from 1999
through 2001, and they are being sued in their personal capacity. The
word on the street is that lawsuit is all about sending a message to the
venture capital community that if you touch these companies, we will
come for your house.
R. ANTHONY REESE: Actually, on the worries about statutory
damages being reinforced by Grokster: although they don't address it
directly, Justice Breyer's concurrence does throw out the possibility of a
statutory damage award. But of course, there's nothing in the statute that
expressly says that statutory damages are available in cases of secondary
liability-because, of course, there's really not anything in the statute
that says anything much about secondary liability at all. So, it's at least
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possible to think that you could have a court that says, "Okay. There are
these secondary liability doctrines. That doesn'tmean all of the remedies
in the statute for direct infringement automatically flow." But the fact
that off-handedly an opinion in Grokster refers to statutory damages may
make that more problematic for the lower courts to do.
KATE GUSMER: We have time for one more quick question be-
fore we break for lunch.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What about the distribution networks? For
example, if we're designing things that are hard drive manufacturers,
computer manufacturers, software manufacturers along the way, ISP's in
transmission. I mean, one also could cover, I think, the whole computer
industry. Is there any way to kind of limit it?
FRED VON LOHMANN: That's sort of the driver behind this
whole secondary liability debate. Nobody wants to make the entire tech-
nology sector liable for every bad act committed by a customer. The
harder question is how in the h*** do you draw the line that makes
sense? I don't think the Supreme Court did a very good job. I had a view
of what I thought a sensible line was that prevailed in the 9th Circuit, but
in the end, didn't prevail in the Supreme Court. It's a hard question.
I will note though, the extent to which this debate begins to drive
toward a focus on obligations to design and as Professor Elkin-Koren
suggests and I think as Judge Posner suggests, these are least-cost-
avoider kinds of discussions. Like who in there is it best positioned to
most cheaply solve the "social problems" caused by the new technol-
ogy? That, I think, leads to chilling conclusions when taken to its logical
conclusion ... because the reality is Microsoft is in a better position to
solve these problems than anyone. I mean by virtue of having ninety-
seven percent of the desktops at its control. ISP's are also incredibly well
positioned by virtue of sitting astride the principal distribution channel.
I worry if we start going down this road to find the person who can
solve the problem most cheaply, you end up untethering these liability
doctrines entirely from a fault-based conception. This is the point in
torts, for those of you who remember this debate. It is an old debate in
torts. In torts, even though law professors wrote articles urging courts to
put the liability on the person who can most cheaply solve the problem,
the courts have never adopted that kind of broad conception. And so, I
think, there is something we can learn here from torts about why that
may not be the ideal option.
MARGARET JANE RADIN: Yes, and you're the last person be-
fore lunch, so make it delicious.
[Audience laughter]
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: All right. The court describes the Grokster
software as a device and by doing that was able to sort make a device...
There's a lot of interdependence and interconnection between the play-
ers. And if you think about the Napster case-that Napster was a service
that rode on top of the growth of public internet and included all of the
people who contribute to the provision of that service and roped into that
lawsuit.
So, I think, it remains to be seen what the court does when it's faced
with something that is much more integrated, much more interactive, and
how this inducement standard or the Sony standard will play out in that.
But, of the many questions the court ducked, I think by characterizing
Grokster as a device, it managed to leave for another day a lot of ques-
tions about interdependent technologies and companies that have those
kind of relationships.
SHARON ARMSTRONG: Thank you everyone on Panel One.
We're going to take a break for lunch now. We'll be breaking until 1:45.
[Applause]
PANEL II
IMPLICATIONS FOR TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
KATE GUSMER: Good afternoon. We're going to go ahead and get
started with Panel Two which is called Implications for Technological
Innovation. As you will hear, this panel will discuss the tradeoffs be-
tween protecting content owners and fostering technological
advancement.
We are privileged to have as a moderator of this panel Professor
Susan Kornfield. Professor Kornfield is a partner in Bodman LLP and
has been an intellectual property attorney for 24 years. She handles
transactional litigation matters involving technology development, com-
mercialization infringement, copyright, trademark, trade secret, and
unfair competition, competitive intelligence, conflicts of interest, and
post-employment restrictions.
Her clients range from small startup high-tech companies to non-
profit museums and foundations to local corporations. Professor Korn-
field is an adjunct professor here at the University of Michigan Law
School, and has also taught at Michigan's Ross School of Business and
the School of Information. Professor Kornfield has been an expert wit-
ness, a mediator and arbitrator in a variety of intellectual property
disputes, and serves on an advisory committee at Stanford University on
matters involving libraries and active information resources.
Professor Komfield, I'll turn the panel over to you at this point.
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SUSAN M. KORNFIELD: Good afternoon. First I'm going to say
how grateful I am to see my current and former copyright law students. I
don't have my teaching iPod with us today because we have a panel of
true experts, and I'm going to tell you a bit about them and also I wanted
to add a personal comment about each.
First, to my left, Edward Felten, who is a Professor of Computer
Science and Public Affairs at Princeton, and I think even that name-
Computer Science and Public Affairs-is a very interesting title. For
those of us who have been following his exploits, we think of him as a
folk hero since a few years ago, he received a cease and desist letter
from the Recording Industry Association of America he and some of his
graduate students were threatened if they were to go ahead and publish
and speak on certain information they had determined about security
flaws in encryption methods. He's going to talk about a number of issues
and, we learned last night that over the last few years, digital rights man-
agement technology has merged with the attributes of spyware.
To his left, Barbara Simons, who is an expert on electronic voting. I
learned last night that hanging chads are the least of our problems. She's
an expert in internet voting. She has worked on matters with the Clinton
Administration, with the U.S. Department of Defense. She is the first
woman to receive the distinguished Engineering Alumni Award from the
College of Engineering at UC Berkeley, and she's a Fellow with the
American Association for the Advancement of Science. She's going to
talk a lot about security issues and technology issues involved in voting.
And to her left is David Sohn, who is at the Center for Democracy
and Technology as staff counsel, and for law students who might wonder
what their professional path might be, he started out practicing law at
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. He went on for five years to advise as
Commerce Counsel, Senator Ron Weyden, and he joined the Center for
Democracy and Technology last year.
And I know that all of you read the front page business section of the
Ann Arbor news last night and there was David's group, the Center for
Democracy and Technology is employing a new technique in its fight
against software service. One of the solutions and to skirt pop-up adver-
tising-public shame. So he's going to talk about the use of public
shaming, perhaps, as an aspect of the technology management.
So we're going to turn it over to Professor Felten first.
EDWARD W. FELTEN: Thanks. About six months ago, Alex Hal-
derman, a grad student who was working with me discovered something
really interesting. He discovered that certain compact discs from Sony
BMG, the world's second largest record company, installed on people's
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computers a piece of software that is generally known as a rootkit which
inserts a kind of security hold into the computer.
This was part of a longer ongoing investigation of the latest genera-
tion of CD copy protection technologies that Alex has been working on
for about the last year. When Alex discovered this, we thought it might
be pretty important and we thought it was certainly very interesting. So
we did what we always do when discovering something important in our
copy protection research. We called our lawyer.
[Audience laughter]
In fact, lawyers were involved in the planning and design of this re-
search program from the beginning. We went right away to our
University's general counsel, we talked to other people outside the Uni-
versity trying to figure out what we could do safely in this area; trying to
figure out how we should structure the research program; which kinds of
experiments were safer to do than which other kinds, and so on-
whether we had a path to publishing the information at all once we
found it.
And, in fact, after discovering this, we spent about a month talking
to counsel at different places, talking to our University's general counsel,
talking to people at the Samuelson Clinic at UC Berkeley, and talking to
others, some of whom would rather not be named.
And while we were talking to counsel and deciding what we could
do about publishing this information about how millions of consumers
were being put at risk by this seemingly harmless product. While we
were doing that after about a month, someone else discovered the same
thing and not being experienced in the field, just went ahead and pub-
lished it.
This opened the floodgates that ultimately led to a bunch of revela-
tions about what Sony was doing. To cut to the end of the story, we
eventually, after this information had come out, and after it became clear
that we were not going to face litigation and so forth or indeed threats
from Sony and others, we went ahead and we wrote an academic paper
describing all of what we had found which is now available on our web-
site.
And if you flip to the end of that paper and look at the acknowledg-
ments section, you see that we acknowledge a number of computer
scientists for their helpful advice and comments on the paper. We then
proceed to acknowledge a larger number of lawyers for legal support. In
fact, it's become a fact of life in this area of research that if you're going
to do work, if you're going to be talking to lawyers from day one, for
every two hours you spend in the lab, you're going to be spending about
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an hour dealing with the legal implications of what you're doing, making
sure that you stay clear of the possible negative consequences, and so on.
It's also a fact of life that when you write the paper describing the
research you have done, that you will leave certain things out. You will
self-censor up to a point in order to make your legal position stronger
should anyone act against you. And, I can say that of the papers that I
have written about copy protection technology, there's really only one
that did not involve at least some modest degree of self-censorship in the
writing of the paper, and that ironically, was the one that was described
before which led to a threat to sue us and ultimately a federal lawsuit.
This was a paper relating to the secure digital music initiative and
the watermarking technologies that they were thinking of deploying. So
the story is that we wrote the paper and we left out some things and we
wrote it sort of carefully to try to reduce our legal exposure. Then they
threatened to sue us anyway. So, as long as they were threatening to sue
us, we figured why not put all that stuff back in?
[Audience laughter]
If we put that stuff back in, there would be a declaratory judgment
action to try to put the issue before the court. So, ironically, the only pa-
per that we ended up publishing with which we haven't self-censored at
least a little in this area was the one that actually did involve federal liti-
gation.
Many of my colleagues in the computer science research community
and computer security research community just won't put up with this
stuff. Many of them say they're allergic to lawyers. They don't want to
have to learn what's in the DMCA. They don't want to have to meet with
their general counsel. They don't want to have to understand what the
case law is. That's not why they went into this field. So to a large extent
what had been a reasonably robust research effort in this area has now
shrunk down to relatively few people who are willing to put up with it.
This is a very real story about the impact of this area of the law and
technologists, and the people to look at are not the people like me who
are just too stubborn to get out of the area. It's the people who are not
there-the students who are not studying this area because they are wor-
ried and they just don't want to put up with the hassle.
Now we heard this morning about the Grokster case and we heard
some very nice analysis and reading of the Supreme Court's opinion.
Questions about what the rules are and so on. It's worth also saying that
it's not just a question of where the legal boundaries are. Questions of
politics and public relations, in fact, matter as well. And I should tell you
that before we publish a paper, we don't just call our lawyer. We also call
our university's public relations person, and we learned to do this be-
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cause we found that occasionally, we would publish a paper and some
congressional staffer would call her up and yell at her about why was the
university letting their people do this terrible thing. So we learned that
we needed to send her a copy of the paper in advance and have a little
phone conversation so she'd be ready to answer those questions. And
now that's again a regular part of the process that we go through before
we publish a paper in this area.
Because, in fact, even if we're careful about the legal factors and we
make sure that what we do is absolutely lawful, we can still cause trou-
ble for ourselves and for the rest of our community if we do something
that can be painted as harmful; can be painted as something a hacker
would do. And so in order to work in this area, you have to be quite care-
ful, and intellectual property law and regulation and sort of the
penumbra of politics and public opinion that have grown up around it are
certainly limiting factors.
It's worth thinking, I think, about how things got this way, about
how what ten years ago would've been considered absolutely main-
stream computer security research is now something that some people
consider legally edgy and people suggest that we're somehow rebels to
be doing this. This is, in fact, mainstream stuff in our scientific commu-
nity, and the papers that we write are, when they're good, published in
the most mainstream and stodgy of research venues.
Part of the problem, I think, that has caused intellectual property to
reach so far is something that I call the regulatory rationale. This is the
idea that it's the job of law and regulation to stop infringement. There-
fore, if infringement is still going on, the problem must be that the law
doesn't reach far enough. And the solution being to increase the scope
and reach of intellectual property law and to continue to do so until in-
fringement is halted. Given that law is not really in a position to stop
infringement in today's world, this is a recipe for increasing overreach.
There's also a technical version of this rationale which says that as
long as infringement is going on, the solution must be to develop and
deploy technology that reaches farther; technology that's more intrusive
in an attempt to stop it. And this is part of the story that led to the Sony
CD copy protection technology that I talked about before which did
really quite astonishing things in reaching into people's computers:
ejecting security holds, installing software without consent, and so on.
A lot of this was the attempt by the designers of this technology to
do more when they found that the technologies that they had designed so
far were not going to solve the problem. And in fact, given that technol-
ogy is not going to solve this problem, this also is a recipe for stepping
farther and farther over the line until you get into trouble. Because if
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you're going to regulate in this area or you're going to design technology
in this area, you have to base your strategy on a realistic understanding
of what it is that the regulation of the technology is actually trying to
prevent and what it's possible for it to do. It's not necessarily the case
that the failure of law or technology to achieve some result means that
more law or technology is required.
And on this particular topic, there's an enormous disconnect be-
tween the policy makers and technologists. I mean, there's always some
kind of disconnect between scientists and technologists on the one hand,
and the people who are making policy relating to that science and tech-
nology. That's sort of just a fact of life.
Whenever there are two different communities talking about a topic,
there's going to be some level of disconnect. But here, the level of the
disconnect is astonishing in the sense that assertions about technology
which are considered laughable in the technical community are not only
considered respectable, but are actually considered true beyond dispute
in some policy discussions. It's quite amazing.
For example, in the computer science research community, the idea
that any technology could have a meaningful impact in reducing peer-to-
peer file sharing is almost considered a crackpot view. That is a topic
which has been well discussed over the years, and the debate over that is
essentially over. No one would seriously get up on the podium at a com-
puter security research conference and claim to have a technology that
would stop people from file sharing. It's simply not as bad as, but in the
same category as arguing, that the earth is flat at a geology conference.
It's simply an outrageous view.
Nevertheless, in policy discussions, it's often taken for granted that
it's reasonable to expect technology to make a significant dent in this
problem. And we saw this in the Grokster discussions and in the Su-
preme Court's opinion. As we heard this morning, the opinion of the
court asserted that the lack of filtering in the design of the Grokster
technology was evidence of inducement. That this is essentially a finding
that a reasonable technologist who actually cared to prevent infringe-
ment, would have, gone down the road of filtering.
Now, the interesting thing about this is that the court really did not
have much in the way of evidence to base this on. What they had were a
few friend of the court briefs from companies that sell filtering technol-
ogy arguing that the court ought to require technology like theirs to be
bought by the people like Grokster on the one side.
On the other side, you had a brief by seventeen computer science
professors including some of the real giants in the field like David Clark,
who's considered as much as anyone the father of the internet, saying
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that filtering is not only unproven technology, but unlikely to work if it
were tested. And also arguing that a well-intentioned engineer could ra-
tionally choose not to pursue filtering given that it was unproven and
unlikely to work.
Now the interesting thing is that in discussing it essentially is saying
that, Grokster should have filtered. Not only did the court disagree with
the brief of the computer science professors, it didn't even bother to
mention it. Imagine if you will, that seventeen distinguished economists
had filed a brief asserting that as a matter of economics, something was
true. And then imagine that the court had asserted the opposite and not
even sort of mentioned or explained away why the economics professors
were wrong. You wouldn't expect that. And the most disappointing as-
pect of the Grokster decision really, to many technologists, was that the
brief of the computer science professors was more or less ignored.
It's also interesting to note what the court said about filtering be-
cause, if you read it carefully, what the court said was this. This is from
page 22 of the Grokster opinion. "Second, this evidence of unlawful ob-
jective (that is objective to induce infringement) is given added
significance by MGM's showing that neither company," (meaning nei-
ther Grokster nor Streamcast), "attempted to develop filtering tools or
other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activities using their soft-
ware." The court is talking not about whether these companies made a
rational decision; they're essentially criticizing them for not trying to
develop filtering technology that would work.
To me it is very interesting that it's the lack of effort rather than the
lack of-even of deployment of the technology that might work-that
the court is criticizing. It's as if it's unknowable, whether filtering tech-
nology would work and the companies had an obligation to try and find
out.
And we see this kind of disconnect in a lot of the policy discussions
that go on where copy protection or infringement fighting technologies
that are as a technical matter just dead on arrival are promoted as solu-
tions and are proposed as mandatory.
We see this in the broadcast plight, for example, and the technology
which really is as a technical matter completely dead on arrival. Never-
theless, there are serious proposals to mandate it, and as a result of this
disconnect, a lot of people in the technology community, a lot of re-
searchers and educators have simply sworn off the public discussion on
this matter saying that folks in Washington are just too clueless to, to
even talk to, and that's, I think, a very disappointing result. There are
some of us who have not given up talking about it, but nonetheless, I
think this disconnect is a very serious matter unless-and unless this
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changes, we're going to I think continue to have pretty bad policy in this
area. Thanks.
SUSAN M. KORNFIELD: Barbara Simons.
BARBARA SIMONS: I'm going to talk about a slightly different
topic. As you said, I was for many years working in copyright and data-
base directive. When Pam was writing about some of the crazy
pre-DMCA proposals, USACM (the U.S. Public Policy Committee of
ACM-the premier Society of Computer Scientists) was addressing
computer related policy issues such as the anti-dissemination provisions
of the DMCA. We were saying that the DMCA would criminalize some
computer security R & D which, in fact, it technically does.
I thought I'd tell you an interesting little story. As many of you
know, the anti-dissemination provisions of the DMCA were delayed until
the year 2000. A few years ago when I was in Washington, I discovered
that the reason for this delay was that people knew about the Y2K prob-
lem. They realized that some of the reverse engineering and other work
that needed to be done for Y2K would technically be illegal under the
DMCA. So they delayed the implementation of the anti-circumvention
and anti-dissemination provisions until 2000. The fact that the Y2K
problem is not the only computer related problem that might require re-
verse engineering somehow didn't dawn on the folks who drafted the
DMCA.
One of the things I'm hoping to accomplish is to convince some of
the folks here that voting machines, voter registration, and other aspects
of voting are of great relevance to this community. Of course attacks on
fair use and first sale, combined with all of the efforts to restrict speech,
are very important and deserving of attention. But if our votes are stolen
or lost or manipulated, then the game is over. When you start studying
technical and legal issues relating to computerized voting, you find your-
self in an Alice in Wonderland world where common senses and
technical expertise become irrelevant.
The testing of voting machines is a joke; the rules relating to the
testing are a joke; and the oversight of testing and machines is a joke.
But today I'm going to focus on the legal aspects of voting and voting
machines. If you have questions about the other areas that I'm skipping,
which of course are very important, please ask me during the question
period or afterwards. I'll be around all day.
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA), passed in 2002 as a result of
Florida 2000 and Florida 2002, allocates almost four billion dollars for
states to upgrade their voting systems. HAVA also mandates that (all)
people with disabilities should be able to vote independently by 2006 or
2007. There is some ambiguity.
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I support the idea of providing accessible voting systems for people
with disabilities whenever possible. (Some people may be so seriously
disabled that there is no way using current technology that they can vote
independently). But the 2006 or even 2007 deadline for providing sys-
tems that allow people to vote independently is a serious problem,
because there is far too little time for the research, development, and
testing needed to develop new voting tools. 2006 is also the HAVA-
mandated deadline by which every state must have a statewide database
of all registered voters. At least 20 states don't yet have the statewide
databases. There are no rules, no regulations, and no standards for the
databases. I would bet a lot of money that in November 2006 you are
going to see massive meltdowns when these databases don't work.
If anyone is interested in problems relating to statewide databases of
registered voters, USACM has just produced a report that contains 99
recommendations, all quite obvious when you think about them. The full
report or just the list of recommendations can be downloaded from
http://www.acm.org/usacm/VRD/. The report contains recommendations
that I'm sure most election officials haven't even thought about, such as
the need for good audit trails, so that it's possible to determine who
made particular changes. Is anyone here from New York?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes.
BARBARA SIMONS: I don't know if you know about this, but
there was a ruling yesterday by a federal judge that gives the State of
New York until April 10th to come up with their plans for implementing
the statewide database and for purchasing voting machines. New York
doesn't have anything yet, and they have until April 10th to devise a
plan. As a result of a lawsuit by the Department of Justice, many groups,
such as the New York State League of Women Voters, are concerned that
New York State is going to be forced to purchase really unsafe, insecure
voting machines because of time pressure from the DoJ.
There are some huge problems with many of the voting machines,
including secret software, secret testing, secret test results, and no possi-
bility of a recount or an audit of the paperless Direct Recording
Electronic (DRE) voting machines that are being widely used in this
country. Voting machine vendors have been retrofitting DREs with paper
that is supposed to make a record of the voter's ballot that the voter can
either accept or reject. This is called a Voter Verified Paper Ballot
(VVPB) or Audit Trail (VVPAT). Unfortunately, really bad engineering
has been used to retrofit the DRE's. The continuous rolls of thermal
printer paper that vendors added to the DREs have created a whole new
set of problems.
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Because votes are stored consecutively on the continuous rolls, there
are privacy concerns. There are also problems with storing the thermal
paper so that it doesn't fade, such as can happen with the receipt you get
from the gas station.
There are also serious concerns about how to conduct audits and re-
counts. You want to count ballots the way we count money, by sorting
the ballots into piles according to the vote and then counting each pile.
This can be done very publicly, very visibly. Unfortunately, with con-
tinuous rolls of paper someone has to read the information off the paper
roll and someone else has to record what was just read. It's a really bad
system. If I had wanted to design a system to make recounts as difficult
as possible, I might have chosen a continuous roll model.
While some states have good voting laws, many states do not. In
some states, it is almost impossible to get a recount or to conduct an au-
dit. California has a very good law that mandates that one percent of all
precincts randomly selected be recounted for every election. Such an
audit is one way to check on some of these voting machines.
Amazingly, when California allowed paperless voting machines, the
audits were conducted by first printing out copies of the votes from the
computer's internal memory and then manually counting the print-outs.
This is a joke, because there is no way to know if the results stored in the
internal memory accurately reflect the will of the voters. Fortunately, in
California we now have a law that no longer allows paperless voting ma-
chines. Unfortunately, many California counties will be deploying badly
retrofitted DREs. The only positive thing you can say about the retrofits
is that they're better than DREs without retrofits. At least there is the
possibility of a recount.
I'm going to quickly review some interesting legal stories to try to
whet your appetite without going into much of a discussion about overall
voting machine issues.
An illustrative example from the 2004 election of how the law has
not kept up with technology is what happened in Carteret County, North
Carolina. Carteret County used a paperless DRE for early voting. Unfor-
tunately, somebody forgot to change the capacity of the memory. After
3,005 votes had been cast on the DRE, the rest of the votes went into a
black hole.
Now losing votes is never a good idea, but in this case it was espe-
cially disastrous, because over 4,500 votes were lost. There were no
records of the votes, because there was no paper backup. Furthermore,
there was a statewide election-in this case for Agricultural Commis-
sioner-where the difference between the two candidates was less than
4,500 lost votes. So, what to do?
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First, the State Board of Elections ordered a revote for Agricultural
Commissioner to be held in Carteret, County. That was thrown out by
the courts. Then, the Board of Elections ordered a statewide revote. That,
too, was thrown out also by the court. Finally, the leading candidate ob-
tained 1,352 affidavits from people who swore that they had voted for
him and their votes hadn't been counted. Since it looked like the judge
was going to accept the affidavits, the losing candidate conceded. That's
how the election was decided.
What happened in Carteret County is an example not only of prob-
lems with voting machines, but also of inadequacies of our election laws.
There is no law in North Carolina to deal with a situation in which pa-
perless voting machines lose a significant number of votes. A legal
problem with rerunning an election is that the people voting the second
time will not necessarily be identical to those who voted the first time.
So, how do you resolve this mess?
I'm going to discuss Diebold in the time I have left. I don't mean to
say that Diebold is especially worse than any other vendor. We are, how-
ever, very grateful to Diebold because Diebold has been of the poster
child for everything that is wrong with DREs. But I want to emphasize
the fact that most other vendors' machines have not been subjected to the
kind of scrutiny that Diebold DREs have received. The lack of scrutiny
does not give us confidence that other vendors' machines are any better
than those produced by Diebold.
Diebold became famous in part because Walden O'Dell, the then
CEO of Diebold's voting machine division, said in a 2003 letter sent to
Ohio Republicans that he was committed to helping Ohio deliver its
electoral votes to the president next year.
[Audience laughter]
So some Democrats woke up and said-
[Audience laughter]
-"My goodness, this doesn't look good. If he can manipulate the
voting machines, he could swing the election."
On February 2003, shortly before the O'Dell letter, a journalist
named Bev Harris found Diebold software on an open FTP website and
downloaded it. Among the files she found was one called Rob-Georgia.
Some people assumed that Rob-Georgia was related to 2002 when the
entire Georgia election had been conducted on Diebold paperless DREs,
and the major Democratic candidates all lost. That's when Senator Cle-
land lost, although he was favored in the polls. The governorship of
Georgia also was won by a Republican for the first time in many years.
However, it turns out that a programmer named Rob Behler was working
on the Georgia file.
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Bev Harris also learned that there were last-minute software patches
being put onto this software before the election. This is completely ille-
gal. These machines are supposed to have been examined and tested, and
only the software that was examined is supposed to be used in an elec-
tion. However, because of their last minute nature, there was no testing
done of the software patches. So in fact nobody can say for sure whether
or not malicious code might have been inserted into the machines which
self-erased afterwards. And no one can prove by a recount or audit that
Sen. Cleland was actually defeated, because there is nothing to recount.
The story continues with Avi Rubin, a computer science professor at
Johns Hopkins, being given the software by Bev Harris. Rubin, together
with colleague Dan Wallach and graduate students Tadayoshi Kohno and
Adam Stubblefield, wrote a paper based revealing many security vulner-
abilities in the Diebold software. Now what's interesting is that the
Hopkins scientists first had to consult attorneys, in this case the folks at
EFF. Furthermore, there was a file that the researchers did not examine,
because it was encrypted using a key that was available on the Diebold
website. The researchers were concerned that if they viewed the file,
even though the key was easily available, they might be in violation of
the DMCA.
The Hopkins Report exposed some very disconcerting security flaws
in the software, including a hard-wired key that was used to encrypt all
the data on the storage device, If you could access one of these machines
and you knew this key, which incidentally was F2654hD4, you could
have manipulated the election.
[Audience laughter]
While Rubin and his colleagues analyzed Diebold software security
in 2003, in 1997 a computer scientist name Doug Jones, who was also
on the Iowa Board of Examiners for Voting Machines and Electronic
Voting Equipment, had warned Diebold against hard-wired keys. Yet, in
spite of the advanced warning Diebold had received, they had not
changed their software. In fact, the man with whom Jones talked had
never even heard the phrase "key management." These are the people
who are running our elections. (A subsequent analysis of security prob-
lems with Diebold software, the RABA Report, revealed yet another case
of identical keys).
Diebold's response to the Hopkins Report was to deny that the code
had ever been used in an election. However, there was a wired news arti-
cle that appeared on August 4th, 2003, in which a Diebold spokesman
Mike Jacobsen "confirmed that the source code Rubin's team examined
was last used in the November 2002 general elections in Georgia, Mary-
land, and in counties of California and Kansas."
Fall 20061 21V Century Copyright Law in the Digital Domain 289
It's interesting that on August 11 th the Jacobsen quote was modified
retroactively. If you look up the article on-line, you will find the more
cautiously-worded phrase that says that the code examined by Rubin et.
al. "on the whole is not the same" as the production code. The careful
rewording suggests that, except for minor changes, the code examined
for the Hopkins paper was essentially the same software used in the elec-
tions.
The State of Maryland was about to buy Diebold voting machines
for the entire state when the Hopkins report came out. Maryland delayed
the purchase and commissioned another report from SAIC. When the
SAIC Report was released, two-thirds of it was redacted. Attempts to
obtain a copy of the redacted portion via public records requests have
failed. That's an area in which I'd like to see the legal community get
involved. By the way, the SAIC Report was redacted by the State of
Maryland, not by SAIC. In fact, the SAIC Report concurred with the
Hopkins study. In the unredacted portion, the report refers to Diebold by
saying "the system as implemented ... is at high risk of compromise."
So you can only imagine what was contained in the part that was not
released.
In spite of some very negative content in the unredacted portion of
the SAIC Report, Maryland and Diebold claimed victory. Maryland
bought the machines, and then the RABA Report, which was also nega-
tive, came out. Each time a new negative report was released, Maryland
election officials and Diebold have said, "Well, we'll fix it; everything's
fine." But every new study that's done of Diebold code, every new ex-
amination, finds more problems.
In 2003 there was another interesting intellectual property dispute
that relates to the DMCA. In the summer of 2003, a hacker broke into
Diebold website and obtained e-mails dating from January 1990 to
March '03. The e-mails, which were quite damning, were originally
posted by Bev Harris on her website. While refusing to acknowledge that
the e-mails were theirs, Diebold forced Harris's ISP to remove the emails
because of copyright violations.
So of course the e-mails popped up elsewhere. One of the places
they were posted-by a group of undergraduates-was Swarthmore Col-
lege. Predictably, the college received a threatening letter from Diebold
demanding that the e-mails be removed. Again, Diebold did not ac-
knowledge that the e-mails were theirs. Rather, Diebold said that they
were going after the emails because of copyright violations. Perhaps
someone could explain the legal logic to me afterwards. I still have trou-
ble understanding it.
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The college removed the e-mails, but that did not solve the problem
for Diebold. Instead, e-mails were posted on at least fifty college and
university websites and even on a high school website.
In November, 2003 the Swarthmore students announced they were
bringing suit against Diebold for abusing copyright law and that EFF was
handling the suit. On December 1st, Diebold withdrew their complaints
against everyone who posted the e-mails on a website. That happened
around that time that representative Dennis Kucinich posted links to the
emails on his website.
So, here's another question I have. Can you go after a member of
Congress under DMCA violation?
PANELIST: Yes, you can.
BARBARA SIMONS: -You can?
PANELIST: So long as he doesn't shout out the URL on the House
Floor.
[Audience laughter]
BARBARA SIMONS: But if he doesn't, okay?
PANELIST: He's okay if he does that.
BARBARA SIMONS: Okay. In October 2004 the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California ruled in favor of the stu-
dents, and Diebold had the honor of being the first company found in
violation of the DMCA. Diebold was fined $135,000 damages and fees.
Is Diebold the only company to have been found in violation of the
DMCA? I don't know, but it's certainly the first.
Next I want to talk to you about Alaska, because there were some bi-
zarre occurrences there in the '04 elections, held on Diebold voting
machines. For example, in some districts the reported voter turnout was
more than 200 percent.
[Audience laughter]
A district by district tally of the totals for Bush resulted in a total of
292,267 votes. But the official total was only 109,889. So there seemed
to be a bit of a discrepancy.
That made the Democratic Party curious to see what was going on.
They made a public records request to get the election database. Initially,
the State Division of Elections refused to turn over the electronic voting
files to the Democrats, arguing that the data format belongs to a private
company and could not be made public.
Diebold claimed that it owned the structure of the database. Al-
though the data is public, the company claimed, the format is a company
secret. (Meanwhile, the format was available on the Web, where it had
been posted by activists). The Elections Director supported Diebold by
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saying that the state contract with Diebold forbade the release of the
data.
Because there was a lot of bad press, Diebold subsequently waived
their claimed rights. However, Diebold cautioned that there was sensitive
information in the files, including encryption passwords, users IDs, and
phone number used to load in the results. "Therefore, in order to provide
the specific information you're seeking in the specific form requested,
the Division," (this is from the Alaska Election Officials), "the Division
is looking into the feasibility of changing the encrypted information as
well as changing the voter numbers for future elections." Well, I'm not
quite sure what all that's about.
So the state continued to delay, even though under Alaskan law they
had 10 days in which to provide the files. Initially, the files were sup-
posed to be released by January 4th. Then the deadline was extended to
January 19th, when the proprietary assertion was made. Next, on Febru-
ary 3rd Diebold said they waived their rights, and the deadline was
extended to February 27th.
On February 27th, the chief security officer of Alaska refused to re-
lease the data because, "Release of any security-related information
creates a serious threat to our ability to ensure confidentiality, integrity,
and enable the leave [sic] of our systems and services."
So from what I can find out right now, the Democratic Party of the
State of Alaska is currently deciding whether to file a lawsuit or to make
an administrative appeal of the denial. [Note: After filing a lawsuit, the
Alaska Democratic Party finally received the voting database in Septem-
ber 2006. The Democrats claim that audit logs in the database were
accessed as recently as July 2006. They are now trying to obtain a copy
of the database as it existed just after the 2004 election.]
I only have like a minute-and-a-half, so I'm going discuss Florida
really quickly. In 2005, Ion Sancho, who was the Election Supervisor of
Leon County, Florida, invited Harri Hursti to test the security of Diebold
precinct-based optical scans voting systems. Hursti had a copy of the
Diebold software and other documentation that had been downloaded in
2003. Hursti discovered some serious security flaws that he was able to
manipulate to produce false election reports.
Optical scan voting systems use paper ballots, but if you don't look
at the ballots after the election, if you depend only on the election re-
ports, which is what many states do, then you can manipulate the
election reports to steal an election. That is because elections are not rou-
tinely audited in most of the country. What happened was that Diebold,
which had a contract with Sancho, refused to deliver the machines. Since
there are only three vendors certified to sell voting machines in Florida,
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Sancho then attempted to purchase machines from Sequoia. Sequoia ini-
tially agreed to sell machines to Sancho, but they backed out of that
agreement on January 1st, 2006. Sancho then attempted to purchase ma-
chines from ES&S. They also subsequently refused to sell machines to
Sancho.
Now, Florida is threatening to take back the HAVA funding from
Sancho, because he has not satisfied the HAVA requirements and has not
obtained machines by the 2006 deadline. Meanwhile, no company that
can legally provide Sancho with voting machines will sell them to him.
Consequently, Sancho has instituted his own lawsuit for breach of con-
tract against Diebold.
There are a lot more interesting happening in Florida and elsewhere,
but I've got to stop. It's a crazy situation, replete with legal issues. We
really need your help. We really, really, really need your help.
SUSAN M. KORNFIELD: And here to help her is David Sohn.
[Audience laughter]
DAVID SOHN: Well, I'm a member of an organization called the
Center for Democracy and Technology. I guess I'll start by saying a cou-
ple words about who we are. We're a nonprofit public policy
organization. We characterize our mission as defending and promoting
civil liberties and democratic values on the internet which means we get
involved in issues like free expression, privacy, as well as some of that
stuff that we see happening on the internet like spyware and the article
that Susan mentioned in the newspaper that has to do with some of our
efforts to expose companies that are advertising with spyware/adware
providers.
We're Washington-based, so we try to be engaged and provide a
public interest voice in some of the technology policy debates that are
going on in Washington in front of the government.
I thought what I would do is two things. Basically, talk a little bit
about our general approach to the issue of copyright and how copyright
protection relates to innovation and the internet, and then offer a specific
example of one case where we looked at government intervention in a
particular instance and tried to document the impact that had on innova-
tion.
So, our general approach. First we do think that rampant infringe-
ment is a real problem. We don't want to see an internet that's
characterized by an accepted practice and culture of mass infringement
with little to deter it. There's a couple reasons for that. One, certainly, is
that copyright is supposed to give an incentive for creation, and we take
that seriously. It's a problem not just for the large media companies that
are often the face of this debate. More and more on the internet, smaller
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players are able to use digital technologies to make types of creative
works that they probably couldn't have made previously, and to find
ways to disseminate them. And so the community with some interest in
copyright not being overrun by the internet is actually pretty large.
But even setting aside the incentive issue, it does seem to us that if
copyright infringement does just become widespread and rampant on the
internet and there's not much to check it, the kind of responses that we're
going to see to try to keep it under control (and we already do see some
of this) are very dangerous. I think they fall into a couple main catego-
ries.
The first category is the kind of response that the copyright holders
themselves might take. They may try to limit the delivery of content to
closed systems or devices and electronics boxes that don't connect to the
internet, and therefore, don't take advantage of all the neat things that the
internet can do.
They could achieve to some extent the same effect by trying to use
really, really restrictive digital rights management technology. There
clearly are questions of DRM's effectiveness, but as you know, it cer-
tainly is the case that when content owners use digital rights
management technology, they're backed up by the legal hammer of
DMCA. So that is a powerful tool that they have.
In our view, if they use that tool extensively, they are certainly
swimming against the tide. There's no question that consumers want to
be able to get the flexibility and the types of uses that the internet and
digital technologies permit. And, if companies try to stymie that at the
outset, the practical result is probably going to be to drive people to
more infringement. That just creates a cycle that basically fuels the prob-
lem.
The risks that we see there-if content owners try to only release
content in ways that are narrowly locked down-the risk is not just that
consumers don't get the kind of uses that they want. There's a real inno-
vation impact as well because an awful lot of innovation that we see
around the internet has to do with companies figuring out interesting and
exciting new ways that people can use and manipulate content. Things
like MP3 players and podcasting. Someone this morning mentioned the
Slingbox as a new technology that lets people enjoy their televisions in a
different way. It's a really fertile field for innovation. But certainly if
content owners are trying to release content only in ways that are nar-
rowly locked down, you have a real possibility that you preclude uses
that people haven't dreamed up yet, and you prevent innovators from
figuring out new devices and ways to use that content.
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The second category of response-and the one that we probably fo-
cus on the most, being in Washington-is government responses. And
there's a variety of types of possible government responses. The most
obvious one is technical design mandates where the government will
basically try to mandate the inclusion of specific technology solutions
designed to fight piracy.
We think that trying to lock in specific technology approaches at the
government level is certainly a bad idea. It's not helpful for innovation.
Closely related to that would be government efforts to not necessarily
mandate a specific technology solution, but rather to give the job to a
government agency-say, the Federal Communications Commission. (I
cite the FCC because there's a specific example of that, which I'm going
to talk about at the end.) But basically, give a government agency some
sort of gatekeeper role where it gets to scrutinize new technologies com-
ing onto the marketplace and see if they look like they incorporate
sufficiently strong technologies to achieve whatever kind of content pro-
tection the government has deemed appropriate. Also a very bad idea for
innovation.
There are other kinds of government responses. One, certainly,
would be overbroad secondary liability. There was a lot of discussion
this morning of Grokster. Before the Grokster decision came down,
Congress was debating a possible legislative effort to flesh out secondary
liability and to try to create some kind of inducement standard.
CDT was participating in those talks and was not at all happy at the
time with the direction things were going. And I note Professor
Samuelson said that had Grokster come out the other way you probably
would've seen this issue back in Congress and again, possibly gotten a
very bad result out of that. I think that's exactly right. There's certainly
some benefit to clarity, but having worked on some of those talks during
the congressional efforts to define inducement more clearly, it really
didn't seem like the kind of standard that was going to come out of any
legislative negotiation there was going to be as good as what the court
did.
So those are the risks that we see. I guess the way that we would like
to see copyright policy proceed-basically, an approach to try protecting
copyrights without having these negative impacts on innovation-would
involve three main things.
One certainly is enforcement against infringers. So that means things
like the lawsuits, frankly, that the content companies have been pursuing
against infringers. We think those do have some deterrent effect. They
definitely send a message about infringement being a problem and some-
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thing that isn't just okay. It's obviously important to target that kind of
behavior.
We also think secondary liability is an important tool. So in working
out the balance with Grokster, we certainly want to protect innovation,
but also need to have a rule that when a company really is purposefully
taking steps to promote infringement, that does seem like the appropriate
case to have some enforcement possible. Congress has actually gone a
long way down the road in providing all sorts of avenues for enforce-
ment. So this is not an area where we see a lot of need for new
legislation. Just back in 2005, Congress passed a law creating tough new
penalties for camcording of movies in movie theaters and for infringe-
ment of pre-release works. So there has been this constant addition of
new tools to the enforcement arsenal. The tools are basically there, but
certainly enforcement on an ongoing basis is one thing that we think can
productively be done.
The second thing-and this is probably the most important of all-is
that the industry has got to roll out legitimate online services. Legitimate
online distribution of content that is attractive enough and convenient
enough and attractively enough priced that it can really convince people
to go ahead and use those legal services rather than trying to engage in
piracy. And iTunes has led the way here, showing that if you offer an
appealing enough product, you actually can compete with the peer-to-
peer networks and infringement options.
I think it's fundamental to all of this to recognize that the ability of
consumers to obtain infringing material on the internet is not going
away. It's here to stay, and none of this effort is ever going of put the
infringement genie entirely back in the bottle. But the goal has to be to
have both a sound legal structure for enforcement against infringers, and
legal options for obtaining content without infringing.
And the third thing, I'm not going to say much about, but I'll just
say that it's public education-to send a message that infringement is a
problem that society takes seriously.
The goal would be that with the right balance of those three things,
you try to make infringement relatively unattractive and you keep the
level of it manageable. If you try to set a more ambitious goal than that
of preventing all infringement or coming up with technology that's going
to end all infringement, it's never going to succeed.
So let me just turn quickly then to the specific case I mentioned. Ed, I
think, mentioned the broadcast flag. He didn't say much about it, so I'll
say what it is. He also referred to it as a technology that's dead on arrival.
I'm not going to get into the technological aspects of it so much as the
procedural aspects. But basically, the idea here was that movie companies
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and other content companies are concerned about piracy of television
programs-that people will copy programs off TV, particularly as TV
goes digital; upload them to the internet; and leave television facing the
same kind of piracy problems as music faces.
So the idea that they came up with to try to stop this was to have
something called the flag. The flag itself is just a marker that would be
attached to the programs that the broadcaster is sending out over the air-
waves. And the marker would basically mark the content as something
that is supposed to be protected. The hard part is, how does downstream
technology-the TV receivers and the other devices-how do you en-
sure that these devices know how to treat the marked content? Well, the
answer under this scheme is that you have the Federal Communications
Commission basically serve as a gatekeeper for technology and say that
they have to approve television receiving devices and that those devices,
in order to get approval, have to show that they have some way of pre-
venting flag-marked television programs from being uploaded and
distributed on the internet.
The FCC went quite a ways down the road of doing this scheme but
ultimately got struck down in court. The court ruled the FCC didn't have
authority to do this. But the issue is very much live; it's back before
Congress, and there is some substantial support in Congress, so this
could come back. What CDT did was we took a careful look back at
what happened during the FCC's process, and the interesting thing that
we found was this. The FCC had an initial round where it looked at
technologies to comply with this flag regime. Thirteen applicants came
forward. All thirteen were ultimately approved.
So in a lot of ways, we feel like from an innovation-friendly perspec-
tive, the FCC could've done a lot worse. They actually weren't rejecting
technologies left and right. They actually approved everything that came
their way. Even so, when you take a careful look, four of the thirteen
applicants had proposed a technology that had pro-consumer features
that really should have been perfectly permissible under the scope of flag
regime as it was set out. What they basically proposed was to provide a
secure way for people to transmit a flagged program over the internet to
a limited number of recipients. So you could send it from your home to
your office, for example.
That was opposed by the content industries who said that they
thought there should be a localization requirement-in other words, that
the flagged content really shouldn't be able to transmit anywhere outside
your immediate home network. What ended up happening during the
course of the process was that once it drew strong opposition from the
content companies, three out of the four technology companies that had
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proposed the feature elected to withdraw it and basically imposed a lo-
calization requirement-the design specs of which were drawn directly
from a memo that MPAA had provided to them telling them what they
wanted.
It's understandable from a business perspective why the companies
might have done this. The process was fairly uncertain. They weren't
really sure how the agency was going to rule on this new technology.
They were worried about the delay in getting their main product out to
market. But the end result is that in three out of the four cases, they
withdrew this consumer-friendly feature that was basically a way to use
some of the location flexibility that the internet provides.
The FCC ultimately approved, in the end, the one technology that
didn't capitulate and that stuck by its guns in keeping this feature. So
that's some good news. But the lesson that we drew is this. We've been
arguing throughout the debate on the broadcast flag that having govern-
ments in some kind of approval-of-technology role like this is itself
dangerous for innovation and poses some real risks. Proponents of the
flag have said that they don't think those risks are very serious. We see
this example as pretty concrete evidence that simply having the govern-
ment in an approval role like this does indeed create risks.
The other lesson that we draw is that if government is going to go
down this road at all-and I noted that one of the topics in the descrip-
tion of this panel is how do you craft legislation that protects both
copyright and innovation-if they're going to go down this road at all,
the way that the approval process is structured is crucially important.
The more discretion the agency has, and the more unguided discretion it
has, the more uncertainty there is, and the more pressure there's going to
be on every applicant to try to make sure that there's no potential objec-
tion to its technologies. And so the more it's likely to try to cut deals
with the established companies that have a particular interest in this area.
So certainly, if you're going to go down this road at all, very clear
standards, set timeframes for approval decisions, and similar procedural
safeguards would be needed. And that's certainly an argument that we've
been trying to make to folks on the Hill as they consider doing legisla-
tion in this area. So I'll stop there.
SUSAN M. KORNFIELD: We saved a lot of time for questions
from the audience, but I first wanted to ask the panel speakers whether
there might be some follow-up comment they had to the comments of
others and I do want to actually take the moderator's privilege here and
pose a question to Professor Felten.
Last night, he mentioned that even if there were pure heart and good
intent in using digital rights management technology, in fact, to prevent
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infringement, that it was doomed to failure. And I wondered whether you
might speak from a technologist's point of view why you think DRM is
in fact doomed to fail.
EDWARD W. FELTEN: Sure. There are several arguments here.
Let me say first that there is really no technical evidence in support of
the proposition that digital rights management can stop peer-to-peer
infringement. There's no theoretical basis for believing that it could ever
work. There's no practical evidence that it might work. No digital rights
management system has ever succeeded in keeping any content off
computer networks ever, and there's no reason to expect that that will
change.
Now I could talk about why that's fundamentally true, but it basi-
cally boils down to the fact that if something is represented digitally as
digital bits, it can be copied. It is sort of the definition of digital informa-
tion that it's by definition copyrighted, and it's by definition
transportable across the internet. The internet can transport any informa-
tion from point A to point B. That's what it's designed to do, and
fundamentally, it's not possible to change that nature of modem commu-
nication technology. It's fundamentally possible to communicate cheaply
from anywhere to anywhere.
Now there are different strategies that people have attempted to use
to make digital rights management technologies work. Let me talk just
about two of them and how they get into trouble.
One approach is the approach followed by DVDs. For example, to
tape the content of the case of a DVD-a movie-and encrypt it and put
the encrypted content onto the disc. But the problem with that scheme is
that the DVD player has to have the decryption key.
You think of encryption as being like locking the content in a safe.
Every DVD player has to know the combination to the safe. And so if
your business claim is to have this secret combination to the safe and
then to build that combination into hundreds of millions of devices that
will be shipped to everyone in the Western world. The failure is pretty
obvious that someone's going to take apart their DVD player and get the
combination out and publish it, and then that's going to be the end of the
story, which is exactly what happened.
Whenever you have one of these encryption-based schemes, the in-
formation is encrypted, but it's always the case that all of the information
needed to unpack it is there in the consumer's house. It's there in the
house, or in the lab of the person who wants to analyze the technology.
And you can unpack all of the different approaches to digital rights man-
agement, and it's always fundamentally the case that all of the
information that's needed to actually unpack the content and getting into
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the eyes or ears of a viewer or listener is right there in the viewer's or
listener's home or in the device that they have access to. Someone will
always be able to take that device apart and get the content out or simply
wait until after it's been decrypted. After all, encrypted videos aren't
much fun to watch. They have to be decrypted and sent via light into
your eye, and light is fundamentally a capturable, measurable thing, just
like in the same way that anything you can hear with the ear you can
capture with a microphone. There are fundamental problems with digital
rights management that make it unlikely to work. So when you take the
fact that all of these methods are leaky and will leak somewhere and
combine that with the fact that once the information leaks anywhere, it
can spread everywhere by internet technology cheaply.
You have a fundamental failure to be able to control the spread of
this content. So as long as two things are true: (A) people have access to
a fast, general purpose internet, and (B) people choose to infringe, you're
going to have a lot of infringement. You have to change one of those two
things to stop infringement, and it seems to me that the one that's more
likely to change is that people choose to infringe.
SUSAN M. KORNFIELD: Questions from our audience to our
speakers? Yes?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: There is some empirical evidence that ex-
port control regimes in the '90's pushed offshore some software
development. I wonder if there's empirical evidence yet to suggest that
higher education, research, or innovation is moving offshore in response
to DMCA or what other sorts of heavy-handed content actual moves by
content members?
EDWARD W. FELTEN: There is some modest evidence of re-
searchers choosing to go to other countries because of these restrictions.
Probably the bigger effect is American researchers being deterred and
that creating a vacuum that researchers from other countries can fill.
Increasingly, research in these areas related to security is interna-
tional in scope, and different institutions, different countries do tend to
specialize in different areas. And you're seeing, I think, an increasing
fraction of the research related to copy protection taking place outside
the United States. This, of course, at a time when the U.S.-based music
and movie industries want more than ever to have a good handle on this
technology.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yeah. I was actually looking for empirical
studies. Have there been any yet that can be cited back to policy makers?
EDWARD W. FELTEN: No, I think there's only anecdotal informa-
tion. It's hard to tell because you have to compare it to a hypothetical
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world where we are not subject to results. Other than that, you're just
asking people what they would have done.
SUSAN M. KORNFIELD: Fred.
FRED VON LOHMANN: All this introspection, I wonder if there's
also a part of that question that goes to the issue of whether more re-
searchers are becoming black hats instead of white hats. It's becoming
lucrative to be a researcher in Moldova or Romania or a number of
places. You'll get paid a lot more to do the work in the black hat com-
munity potentially, and I always worry from a security point of view. We
should never deter the best people from working on the white hat side
because there will be people who will always be working on the black
hat side.
But my question actually goes to something David Sohn raised: the
idea that if Grokster had come out the other way, Congress would've
gotten in the game and the outcome would almost certainly have been
worse. I actually take the opposite position. I think that's incorrect, and I
think that it's empirically and demonstrably incorrect because in the dis-
cussions that the CDT and others were involved in, there were a number
of drafts exchanged in an effort to craft a compromise version of the
INDUCE legislation. Although the two sides never came to an agree-
ment, the copies I've seen lead to sort of the last position that the content
industry was willing to sign off on. A position which ultimately the tech-
nology sector wasn't willing to accept, but that last position, it seems to
me as I read that measure, is much better than what we got in Grokster if
you're taking the point of view of a person who wants to create an envi-
ronment for innovative technology.
In other words, it was clearer. It created some exceptions for ISP's
and for others that obviously we don't enjoy in the Grokster context. So
I wonder why do you think Congress would've done worse given the
legacy of trouble that the Supreme Court left us with?
DAVID SOHN: Sure. So the answer to this question does depend
partly how you feel about the Grokster case. I guess I'm a little more
optimistic about how that case came out. I think you're right that there
were some exceptions that were drafted into the two versions of legisla-
tion that might have been useful. I still know that there was a lot of
unease in the technology industry overall about the shape of those bills,
and I think that the way I've heard some people put in reacting after the
decision is that the Grokster case, in part because it's a court decision, it
has this kind of sheen of culpability to it. The court was really looking at
the fact that these guys seemed to be bad actors. The Court wanted some
kind of evidence of active steps to induce infringement, and it is maybe
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easier to demand that in a judicial context than to actually spell out in
legislative language precisely what we're looking for.
SUSAN M. KORNFIELD: Okay. Barbara do you have follow-up
comment?
BARBARA SIMONS: Yes. Regarding the black hat/white hat issue
that you raised, I may not have been clear about some of the issues that I
am very concerned about. The fact is that the software in voting ma-
chines is secret and people are afraid to look at it. That seems like a
situation where white hats can play an important role, because we want
to find out if there are security issues. We want to learn if the software
has been rigged, but we can't legally do so. When it comes to voting ma-
chines, copyright and trade secret law is being very much used in an
anti-democratic way. The reason that I discussed Sancho is that he
brought in a white hat researcher to examine the voting machine. Be-
cause the researcher found serious security problems, Sancho is being
prevented from buying any voting machines. And because the vendors
won't sell Sancho any machines, the state is going after him because he's
not adhering to the 2006 deadline in HAVA.
KATE GUSMER: There were some questions in the back.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You say that you think the DRM will
never really be fully effective. It's obvious that no matter what's going to
happen, there's still going to be some isolated darkness. There's still go-
ing to be content traded if there were some copyright holders. But I just
sort of looked at some of these things happening on the public policy
front, DMCA, and some states adopted a Super-DMCA of sorts. Michi-
gan is one of them that has things similar to the national level. Isn't there
some point in which the controls become so onerous that people will
actually choose the illegal route rather than continue to use the legal al-
ternative?
EDWARD W. FELTEN: Well, I think certainly the controls can be-
come arbitrarily onerous. The question is whether doing that will
actually stop the infringement and I think not. Certainly, the DMCA has
not succeeded in doing so. That's been demonstrated over and over, and
again as long as eyes and ears insist on receiving analog inputs and the
internet can trade this material, then people will be able to do it.
I don't believe that the trusted computing technologies will change
that fundamental fact because in order to get to the state of sort of techno
lockdown that some people say will flow from those technologies, many,
many other things have to change. And in particular, the systems that
people use are going to have to become a lot less useful for a lot of the
things that they want to do in order for them to lockdown to have them,
and I just don't think that the market will accept that. I think that a
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locked down operating system will be perceived as essentially useless by
end users not doing many of the things that they want to do and won't be
accepted. And so, I still think that any technological scenario that seems
realistic is going to feature the possibility of infringement.
Now I do think that there is a possible future in which there are at-
tractive to consumers ways of paying for and using copyrighted content
in ways that people like. And, if those attractive services are available
and they're priced right, I think people may pay for them. But it's not
because technology stopped them from infringing: it's because they
made the choice that they wanted to live within the authorized ecosystem
of authorized products instead of the other way.
But I think that, that alternative of infringing rather than paying for it
and living within the authorized system will always exist. It's just a
question of making an alternative that's good enough that people will
choose it. I don't think you can take away that choice.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This question is for Dr. Simons. You paint
a pretty dismal picture of electronic voting and its state in the United
States and I was just wondering-especially with the massive meltdown
that you predict-will there be any pieces for those of us who are to be
future attorneys to pick up and help fix this area?
BARBARA SIMONS: Oh, yeah. I think there's a lot of work that
current and future attorneys could be doing right now, which is why I
pleaded for your help. The EFF has been doing a great job, but there are
only so many people at EFF and they can't handle all the cases. I think
there are a lot of open record requests that need to be filed around the
country, so that we can learn about the contracts that have been signed,
as well as relationships between election officials and vendors. There are
many instances, unfortunately, in which election officials subsequently
go to work for vendors. There are also cases in which the vendors seem
to be working far too closely with election officials.
It would also be really useful if legal experts could help computers
security experts legally obtain voting machine software. Many states
have the software, but they won't let outside experts examine it.
A few months ago California tested ninety-six Diebold machines
under Election Day-type conditions. There were twenty crashes and
fourteen printer failures. It's clear that the private entities that do the test-
ing do an amazingly poor job. There is also the questionable practice of
having the vendors-not the state-pay the testing organizations.
I also hope you will encourage states to conduct realistic testing, as
California has done. Even more important, states should be prevented
from signing contracts that allow voting machine companies to keep
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their software secret. There are no trade secrets in these codes. All they
are supposed to do is record and count the votes.
[Audience laughter]
Really the trade secret argument is a canard and even Michael
Shamos-those of us who are working this area know Shamos, because
he's one of two computer scientists who sometimes support these ma-
chines-even he will say that the trade secret argument is absurd. The
only trade secrets they have are the software bugs.
[Audience laughter]
So please help us. Challenge election officials and vendors. Talk
with Cindy and me afterwards, and we'll give you lots of things you
could work on. Right, Cindy?
CINDY COHN: I'm Cindy by the way.
BARBARA SIMONS: There she is.
[Audience laughter]
CINDY COHN: Barbara's one of the technologists and I'm one of
the lawyers who are trying to push more lawyers into this. There is a lot
to be done. In fact, I think that actually we need a huge revolution in the
way that election laws work. We need to think about election administra-
tion not only from a perspective of actually creating a digital secure
environment, but also creating a procedural and legal framework that
supports the technology. That is a huge job, and one that could be many
people's life's work.
I think what we saw, as Barbara says, when we started looking at
election laws, was that outside the context of traditional equal protection
and apportionment-type issues, when you actually start to think about
elections as administrative systems. From that perspective, we saw how
truly inadequate the law is currently. It's going to be a lot of work to try
to clean up something of this magnitude. It's really fascinating and fun
and it's interesting litigating policy or procedural or administrative-type
work.
BARBARA SIMONS: I have a really quick comment. We need new
laws in this country. We need to have random manual audits conducted
in every state for every national election, even if the election is not close.
SUSAN M. KORNFIELD: Robert?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This is particularly a question to Professor
Felten. The term fair use hasn't come up as much in this conversation. It
strikes me that regardless of how effective or ineffective DRM's use has
been, those of us who have to crack them to exercise our fair use-I con-
fess, I use videos in my classes which is clearly protected under the fair
use, but in order to exercise my fair use rights as a professor in a class-
room, I have to break that code. I have to use the D sets, and that leaves
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me criminally liable for the reverse engineering laws used today. I guess
what I'm saying is from that perspective, it doesn't really matter whether
the DRM actually works. What actually matters is if anybody tries to
break it they are in violation and it's a unilateral action on the part of the
content provider, it can actually lockdown content that is not even copy-
righted in cases. Do you see any way that we can get around that?
EDWARD W. FELTEN: Technologically, apparently, you can get
around it.
[Audience laughter]
Legally, it's just a matter of changing the law. But this is actually, I
think, an important point about these DRM technologies because al-
though they're not effective at controlling this sort of widespread P2P
infringement that their advocates are always talking about they do have
some effect in controlling how the average users who have paid for the
content use it within their own local library. That's an area where DRM
can have an effect on average, and there is revenue in that control for the
copyright owners. So, there's a certain cynical view of this debate that
says that while we have all this public rhetoric about P2P infringement,
everybody who's sort of behind the scenes really knows that that's not
the effect that this technology will have.
The effect of the technology really is to give copyright owners more
control over the uses that purchasers of the content make, and I'm not go-
ing to say that I always subscribe to that cynical view of the debate, but I
think it's a perspective that's worth bearing in mind. That there's more at
stake here than just the P2P issue, and often the P2P issue is really a red
herring. Even if some of the people in the debate do believe that they're
controlling people from infringement, it's worth bearing in mind that these
other effects are the real primary effects that DRM actually has.
SUSAN M. KORNFIELD: And Robert, you can consult with any
of my copyright law students who will tell you that there's some good
recent case law that's come down saying if you're not otherwise commit-
ting infringement, it's not a violation of the DMCA. So my students,
raise your hand to be able to consult with Professor Frost.
[Audience laughter]
We have time for one more question and then our panel time is over.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It seems that one of the major problems is
getting people involved and interested in this area of the law. One of the
fundamental problems is that it's such a small percentage of law students
have difficulties going into this field because of the lucrative careers
elsewhere. So how do we get more technically proficient people engaged
in this area? I know that Professor Felten presumed that a lot of profes-
sors don't want to deal with it. How do we change that?
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EDWARD W. FELTEN: Well, our students are still young and na-
ve and still want to change the world. I think there are opportunities to
get involved. I do think that the younger generation of lawyers and law
students are more tech savvy than their elders. That's true in almost
every field including computer science, that our younger students are
more tech savvy than we were at their career stage.
There's also a surprising number of technologists who are becoming
lawyers. At Princeton, it's now the case that about ten percent of our
computer science bachelor's graduates go straight to law school.
[Audience laughter]
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What a waste.
[Audience laughter]
EDWARD W. FELTEN: He says "what a waste." It may be a waste,
but it is happening. And those people, I think, will make a difference on
the legal side even if it if they're not living up to their full potential.
[Audience laughter]
SUSAN M. KORNFIELD: Ed and I were talking about this last
night. I guess earlier it was the P2P stuff, then the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, and now bogie, these are all topics that have brought
computer science into the political world-like it or not. So, I think our
community's become more aware and as you say there are young, ideal-
istic students who decide the only way they can deal with this is to also
get a law degree. I've had students do that, too.
EDWARD W. FELTEN: The other sense in which this can happen
is through large technology companies. There you have a lot of engi-
neers and you have companies whose phone calls will get returned to
Washington. And that matters a lot to be able to get your phone calls re-
turned and to be able to get yourself invited into the room where the
deals get made.
An ordinary technologist has no hope of doing that, but the represen-
tative of Microsoft or Cisco or Google, maybe can do that. And they do
have a technology viewpoint. Although it is the viewpoint of the tech-
nology company.
DAVID SOHN: I just wanted to follow-up on that. Working in
Washington, that's absolutely true. Those companies play a really impor-
tant role in a lot of these debates. But their interests can be different
sometimes than the interests of a small start-up who is just getting going.
SUSAN M. KORNFIELD: I'd like to thank our panelists for travel-
ing such a distance and being here today.
[Applause]
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KATE GUSMER: We'll, we'll take a short recess. We'll reconvene
for Panel Three at 3:30 and there are refreshments in the hallway, so help
yourself.
PANEL III
INTERNATIONAL ALTERNATIVES AND ENFORCEMENT
KATE GUSMER: Now we're going to start Panel Three which is
INTERNATIONAL ALTERNATIVES AND ENFORCEMENT. This Panel is being
moderated by Richard Owens. Professor Owens is the Executive Director
of the Centre for Innovation Law and Policy in Toronto. Before entering
academia, Professor Owens was a partner with Smith Lyons LLP, where
he led the firm's IT and IP practices. His teaching and writing interests
include intellectual property, financial services, privacy, e-commerce,
biotechnology and the law of the cyborg.
Professor Owens is the Director of the International Technology Law
Association and teaches courses including the Law of Information Tech-
nology and Electronic Commerce, Innovation Law and Policy, and
Policy of Biotechnology, all at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law.
RICHARD OWENS: Let me start by congratulating the organizers
for bringing together such an interesting and expert roster of speakers in
such an in-depth and well-prepared conference.
I am delighted to be here. The Centre for Innovation Law and Policy,
which I represent here, is a multi-disciplinary centre for the study of all
aspects of innovation law and policy, located at the University of Toronto
Faculty of Law. We have many programmes including graduate degrees,
for those of you inspired by the parade of luminaries to continue your
scholarly endeavors. More information can be found at the Centre's web
site.
In my role as moderator, I have been asked to provide some context
on the issues for the panel, so I will say a few words and then introduce
our speakers.
We are all here because of the internet. Grokster and the whole file
sharing project are, of course, artifacts of our digital interconnectedness.
And it is a trite observation that this interconnectedness need not ob-
serve national borders. To this trite truth, however, there is a growing list
of exceptions such as the French Yahoo case limiting the ability to sell
Nazi Memorabilia in France from outside the country.
Our panel addresses itself to this annoying aspect of the Internet; the
frustration of rights holders who, in spite of being able to pay the exorbi-
tant fees of powerful lawyers like Fred von Lohmann-not, admittedly,
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that they would choose Fred, of course-finding that their pit-bull law-
yers are on jurisdictional chains that don't reach the pirates baiting them
from outside the nation's borders.
FRED VON LOHMANN: I would agree.
[Audience laughter]
RICHARD OWENS: A response to this conundrum is international
lawyer deployment; to take the war to the location of the infringer or
circumventer, whether that is Norway or Amsterdam or the United
States. In the case of Canada, it turns out to be effective to sue in Phila-
delphia, as happened in the iCrave TV case involving a Canadian web
site's unauthorized use of American broadcast signals.
These tactics are expensive. They depend on the vagaries of local ju-
risdictions-like Canada, for instance, which has not updated its
Copyright Act to bring it into compliance with the WIPO Copyright
Treaty and which has a blank media levy which, in one instance, was
found to legalize unauthorized music downloading. Each piece of litiga-
tion only provides a remedy as far as damages in that particular country.
Now if that country is the United States, it might effectively rob the en-
terprise of its economic rationale, and thereby stop it; if it is an
insignificant market like Canada, it won't. If an injunction issues and
access to the network can be geographically controlled, then only local
use will be affected; if access cannot be geographically controlled, as
was found to be the case with iCrave TV, then the enterprise will be shut
down.
Long-arm jurisdiction is a partial answer. But efficacy of long-arm
jurisdiction ultimately hinges on the willingness of other jurisdictions to
recognize it, or on a defendant's connection with-preferably assets in-
the U.S.
In the British Columbia internet libel case of Braintech v. Kostiuk,
the B.C. Supreme Court refused to enforce a Texas court's exercise of
jurisdiction over a B.C. resident. In another example of ambitious exer-
cise of jurisdiction backfiring, extensive rights of access to data under
the Patriot Act has created political pressure resulting in effective limits
on outsourcing of data processing to U.S. companies.
The ability to protect intellectual property in foreign jurisdictions
improves with strengthening local laws and their enforcement. So rights
holder jurisdictions like the United States pursue the harmonization of
intellectual property protection through instruments like TRIPS, and ele-
vation and modernization of the standards of IP protection through
instruments like the WIPO copyright treaty.
Still, these international agreements are subject to variations in local
implementation, and even non-implementation. The recent announcement
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by France that it will introduce legislation to require Apple to abandon
its TPMs in order to ensure multi-platform operability of its iTunes
downloads is a particularly apposite example.
In any event, internet challenges to intellectual property rights inspire
new energies in legal reform. Policies like the requirement for service pro-
vider filtering of content lurk in the wings after Grokster. These kinds of
policy initiatives gain momentum from P2P networks tainted by illegality.
One source of such taint is the traffic in child pornography over them, a
reality to which rights holders are alert and in which they may find po-
lemical advantage. So too P2P network operators seem shady not only by
adopting the -ster suffix, but also by hiding their operations from the ef-
fective exercise of jurisdiction, as Kazaa went to great lengths to do, or as
Earth Station 5 has by locating in the Palestinian territories. So, in the
fora of public and judicial opinion, the equities are not with the P2P net-
works.
These networks do represent technological innovation and they
benefit from policies promoting innovation. From a public policy per-
spective, then, arguments for controls on networks and devices are met
by national innovation policies to encourage social wealth creation by
technological discovery. But these national policies are notoriously
vague and their effects unquantifiable, and will likely bear less political
force than arguments about theft of IP and protection of children.
Peggy Radin set a great precedent for introductions by suggesting
you read the biographies of the panel in your materials.
Our speakers will be brief to allow lots of time for audience partici-
pation.
MICHAEL GEIST: Thanks, Richard, and let me add my thanks to
the organizers both for the invitation and for a really interesting day.
Richard just presented the internet and the jurisdictional issues as a prob-
lem. I'd like to present it in a little different way by describing why
sovereignty is really great.
As I was flying in yesterday, I noted that it was literally only on ap-
proach that I left Canadian air space and landed at the airport in Detroit.
While geographically we're very close, there's a significant distance at
least for the moment between Canadian law and U.S. law. And so when
we're talking about international approaches to these issues, I don't want
to talk so much about enforcement. Rather, I want to talk about choices
and different choices that some countries want to make.
I need to give you five backgrounders about Canadian law, and then
tell you where it is we may be going. First, we don't have a DMCA. Yes,
you can applaud.
[Audience laughter]
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We did sign the WIPO treaties back in 1997, but as I'm sure you all
know, signing the treaty doesn't create any obligations on a country. Ob-
ligations only arise from ratification.
[Audience laughter]
It's only when you ratify it that you're required to do something, and
we have yet to ratify it, and in fact, we're very unlikely to ratify even if
we implement. There's now "bureaucratic speak" in Canada that we
might implement the treaty, but we won't ratify it because we will take
on additional obligations that would largely involve transferring large
amounts of royalties south of the border here to the United States and
that doesn't really benefit our artists. That's part of national cultural pol-
icy. We'd rather show that our royalties are paid to Canadian artists-
Avril rather than Britney.
[Audience laughter]
So we don't have a DMCA. We do have a private copying levy, and
so in Canada those that download for personal noncommercial purposes
do so at least arguably lawfully. The private copying levy, which is a
levy that is placed on blank media, such as blank CD's, has generated
more than $140,000,000 over the last five years in Canada. That's a
small amount by U.S standards, but we're a small country. So
$140,000,000 is actually pretty sizable amount of royalties to be gener-
ated, particularly given that they go directly to, by and large, the artist.
And so when we talk about peer-to-peer, the debate is a somewhat dif-
ferent one because, by and large, much of the activity could be argued to
be lawful. We haven't had anywhere near the 17,000 or so lawsuits that
the RIAA has launched in the United States. We've had one series of
lawsuits involving twenty-nine alleged file sharers, and that lawsuit was
unsuccessful. I should note that we, too, have a public interest technol-
ogy law clinic in our law school-CIPPIC-and it involved itself in this
case. Those lawsuits were launched by the recording industry against
these twenty-nine alleged file sharers, and they were unable to get to
stage one because the ISP's were not required to disclose the identity of
the alleged file sharers.
For one thing, the evidence the recording industry provided seemed
to be faulty, and for another, we have national privacy legislation that the
judge didn't think should be eliminated because the recording industry
decided to sue. Moreover, there were questions about whether or not this
constituted an infringement of Canadian copyright law. That decision
was ultimately appealed, and while the decision itself was upheld, the
appellate court certainly created a road map by which we could see fu-
ture lawsuits, but as of this date, we haven't seen any.
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It's also important to note that we don't have copyright within our
Constitution the way that you might, but we have had a very active Su-
preme Court of Canada, at least in recent years. Up until fairly recently,
it was the view of the court that copyright law in Canada was an artist-
focused statute. So the purpose was to ensure adequate compensation for
artists. Yet, in a trilogy of cases handed down by the court over the past
four years, the court has really re-focused the copyright debate making
quite clear that copyright law is all about a balance.
Articulating the need both for compensation for creators, but also the
importance of users, the court has gone so far as to characterize the ex-
ceptions that exist under copyright law as user rights, arguing that those
user rights must be set up against the creator's rights and that there must
be a true balance.
One final thing, we don't have fair use. We have fair dealing, which
sounds similar, but it's not entirely the same. The Canadian Supreme
Court has granted a very broad and liberal interpretation to fair dealing.
For example, full articles may be permissible for copying purposes as
fair dealing, but it is limited just to a series of categories. So the catego-
ries that we have, things like research and private studies, criticism and
news reporting, are exhaustive. I believe we would do far better by add-
ing two words to our statute, "such as," to make those illustrative rather
than exhaustive.
Anyway, that's the background you need to know. It won't come as a
surprise to learn that there has been mounting pressure in Canada to
adopt WIPO-like standards. We don't have a DMCA, but many people
will say we don't have a DMCA yet because it is seemingly, in the view
of some, only a matter of time.
The government last consulted on this issue several years ago. In
2001, it asked questions about digital copyright-related issues, primarily
any circumvention questions, making available right type issues, as well
as the role of internet service providers and what kind of liability ISPs
might face in those takedown-type systems, as well as whether or not
they ought to enjoy some sort of exemption for some of the activity that
takes place on their systems.
In 2004, a Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage-the equiva-
lent of a Congressional committee-issued a fairly important report on
copyright reform in which it embraced DMCA-like provisions. Just last
year, the government finally did move on copyright reform, introducing
Bill C-60, which was our first major piece of copyright reform legisla-
tion in about seven years. I'm not going to go through the whole bill, in
part because the bill has now died. We've had a change in government
and the bill didn't make it past its initial introduction. But it is worth not-
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ing a couple of things because when we talk about choices, these are the
kind of choices countries can make. On the issue of internet service pro-
viders, you may note that in the United States, you have a notice and
take-down system which a copyright holder can send notification to an
ISP alleging that there is infringing content on their system or being
posted by one of their subscribers and ask them to take it down. Notice
and then takedown.
Simply put, that system doesn't work. It certainly doesn't work in a
peer-to-peer environment where there is nothing for the ISP to take down
because it's residing on the individual's computer. That doesn't stop
people from generating literally tens of thousands of these notifications.
In Canada, we chose not to follow the notice and takedown ap-
proach, at least under Bill C-60, but instead adopt a notice and notice
approach. A notice and notice approach would involve a notification
from a rights holder to an ISP. The ISP would be obligated to simply no-
tify the individual subscriber that they had received this notification. If
the rights holder wanted to go further, they could go to court and actually
seek some sort of remedy to actually order the ISP to remove the con-
tent.
Supporters of this note for one thing, it's a better system because a
notice and takedown doesn't work. For another, Richard mentioned child
pornography on peer-to-peer.
We actually do have a notice and notice system in place already. It
exists for child pornography under our criminal statute, and so ISP's are
not required to take down child porn based merely on notification. So, if
it is good enough for child pornography, one might think that it would
also be good enough for an allegedly infringing song.
We also introduced fairly limited anti-circumvention provisions. The
new anti-circumvention provision ensured that any circumvention would
only become an infringement where it was done for the purposes of
copyright infringement. In other words, if you circumvent it for another
purpose, let's say for privacy for example, that would not be an in-
fringement. There's actually a limited exception for private copying, but
I don't need to get into it.
We also didn't include anything on devices-no ban or criminaliza-
tion of devices whatsoever. That, too, I would describe as an innovation
strategy. Bill C-60 has died and we've had a change in government. I
want to very quickly tell you about where it is we may be headed.
First, we've had this change of government. We had a Centrist party
switch to another Centrist party which is seen as a bit more right-wing,
but in Canada, everybody's sort of in the mushy middle. This new gov-
ernment is expected to take a more market-oriented approach. Now I
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don't know what that necessarily means. CATO came out with a study
just this week which would be seen as more market oriented. Their ar-
gument is that, from a market-oriented perspective, the DMCA is not
particularly a good thing. So we'll have to see whether or not the gov-
ernment adopts seriously its notion that it wants to take a market-
oriented approach. Note that we do have iTunes and the new Napster and
the like right now absent a DMCA.
In Canada, as in many jurisdictions, the stakeholders are getting ever
louder. The copyright lobby is getting very vocal and just over the last
few weeks, for example, they've brought in a series of experts, including
the Registrar of Copyrights here from the United States and one of Can-
ada's leading computer law experts who is now a lobbyist for the
recording industry. They came together and put together a show for gov-
ernment officials, then they went to the Canadian Music Week, put on
the same show, and then, I think, they were part of another event at the
University of Toronto. So, there is certainly a fair amount of activity
that's taking place from the lobbyists who argue that C-60 didn't go
nearly far enough and that Canada really needs more.
At the same time, users are becoming far more vocal and there's
been a recurring theme about what can individuals do about these issues.
I actually think that as much as it's great to get involved in clinics, you
can do an awful lot without a clinic. You can do an awful lot just on your
own. Blogs and other new technologies give people the power of voice
that they didn't have before and users are speaking out. In our last elec-
tion just in January, I got involved in a fairly public debate that started
from through my blog and then through a lot of other blogs with the per-
son who actually chaired that standing committee on Canadian heritage
that developed that report that I just described. She then became the Par-
liamentary Secretary for Canadian Heritage and the lead person on
copyright. It turns out that the recording industry, the movie industry,
and the software industry was holding a fundraiser for her four days be-
fore the election. I didn't think that was so good.
[Audience laughter]
So I posted something on my blog and some other people, Boing
Boing, posted it on their blog and lots of bloggers started picking up the
story, and people started raising it at candidates meetings. Those meet-
ings were soon after posted to YouTube, with video in which the
candidate said she wouldn't be intimidated by Michael Geist and his pro-
user zealous and EFF members.
[Audience laughter]
The issue generated considerable discussion and the Member of Par-
liament actually lost her seat. There was a swing of a fair number of
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votes and whether the impact that the bloggers had, nobody knows for
sure, but this was by far the biggest swing of any riding in the City of
Toronto. People have a voice-as many local bloggers noted, pro-user
zealots are voters, too.
[Audience laughter]
I think there's a tremendous opportunity for everyone to speak out if
these are issues that concern you. That must be set up against growing
pressure from the United States, quite frankly, for a change in Canada, a
change that follows more particularly the U.S. style approach. Part of it
comes from the copyright lobby associations like the Canadian Re-
cording Industry Association, the Canadian Motion Picture Distributors
Association, who are by and large U.S. organizations in Canadian cam-
ouflage. They put the name Canada in front, but answer to their sister
organizations in the United States. I think even more important is the
pressure that comes directly from the U.S. government. The Section 301
report that comes from the USTR (the United States Trade Representa-
tive) regularly puts Canada on the list. Frankly, just about everybody's
on the list, so we're in good company.
[Audience laughter]
I expect that Canada will get particular mention this year as being an
egregious example of a country that hasn't done enough on the copyright
and there are certainly those that will take that very seriously. Of course,
people pay attention when this issue escalates up to a trade level issue.
There are many countries including Australia, Singapore, and Morocco,
that have signed trade deals with the United States that include numerous
provisions that deal specifically with copyright. To read just how ex-
treme, in fact absurd, it gets-if you take a look at the Morocco deal,
there is something like a 30-page side letter that talks about what an ISP
in Marrakesh must do if it receives a notification from a rights holder.
I think that my country is probably going to join that list. We already
have the free trade agreement, so we can't be threatened with free trade,
but we do have trade irritants, such as lumber and fishing.
The counter to this is that there are, of course, global changes that
are happening all around the world, and we've heard a lot today already
about the changes in France.
Just a few weeks ago, Australia came out with a unanimous parlia-
mentary committee report taking a look at TPMs and the implementation
of anti-circumvention legislation. For those of you that don't know, they
did create anti-circumvention legislation back in 2000. They then signed a
free trade agreement with the United States in which the U.S. said, "Your
anti-circumvention legislation isn't good enough. Here's the additional
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stuff we'd like you to include," and Australia is now in the process of
doing that.
Well, their parliamentary committee came up with an incredible re-
port in which there are literally dozens of recommendations about the
kinds of exceptions that are needed so that if you are going to have a cul-
tural policy, if you're going to have an industrial policy, if you don't
throw all of that out the window for the sake of creating ever stronger
copyright protections that send most of the royalties that are generated
outside of the country.
And then even at the international level, WIPO is engaged in an ab-
solutely fascinating debate right now as part of the development agenda
where large numbers of countries from South America, from Asia, from
Africa are beginning to question many of the kinds of agreements that
we've seen in the past, and starting to push back. So, the question from
the old Canadian parochial perspective, of course, is what impact will
that have? We had for a long time people arguing that Canada must meet
international standards. Well, if international standards mean the French
iPod legislation and all the exceptions that Australia's talking about and
the exceptions that Chile raised at WIPO, I'm all for international stan-
dards.
And so this is, I think, the kind of international framework that Can-
ada is facing, but it's not just Canada. It is many other countries that are
in similar situations. Thanks very much.
RICHARD OWENS: Thanks, Michael. Professor Oswald.
LYNDA OSWALD: Thank you. As the moderator said, I come from
the Business School right across the street, so I think I won the award
today for coming the least distance to the conference.
Since I teach in a business school, my perspective on this, I think, is
very different from those of the other presenters today. I approach the
topic as a law professor who teaches primarily MBA students-future
clients, not future lawyers. And that different orientation, I think, causes
me to come at these issues from a slightly different direction.
I teach IP law each year to about one hundred-thirty graduate stu-
dents, and these are the people who in ten or fifteen years are going to be
the leaders in their industries. They're going to be the ones out there
managing the rampant technological changes that are certain to sweep
over us in the coming decades.
One-third of these students are international students. They're pri-
marily from China, India and Southeast Asian nations. All those
countries who, if you believe the accounts that are given, are going to be
eating our lunch in a decade or two. They have a very different perspec-
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tive on how the world looks, how the business environment should look,
and how the legal environment should look as well.
Now, the students I teach amaze me because they're so much more
sophisticated, both the American students and the international students,
than the students of my generation-which we won't talk about how
long ago that was, but it was a while. They're far more widely traveled
than we were at their age. They're far more technologically savvy as one
of the other presenters mentioned. This is a point which I will confess to
you: I have never even so much as held an iPod in my hand, but I kind of
know what they are.
They have a much better understanding, I think, of the diversity of
the international political, legal, social, cultural, and economic norms,
and they have an ability to adapt that is so quick and so agile that some-
times I am just stunned at the things that they can do.
These are the managers in training. I think they are the wave of the
future. They are going to be the ones developing the technology and
businesses that are going to be driving new IT products, and ultimately,
the types of IT global activities that we'll see in the future. And I think
they see different challenges posed by the environment that we face, the
legal and the business environment, but they also see unlimited opportu-
nity.
They're also the ones that are going to demand that we, as lawyers,
figure out a way to develop an IP legal regime that will be flexible and
sophisticated enough to handle these technologies that we don't even
know about yet today. We know the technologies are coming, but we
don't know yet what form they'll take.
I don't want to talk today really about specific legal regimes that
countries have developed for handling digital products in particular, but I
do want to share some general thoughts on the types of issues that we
face in this digital arena, and the effect that those issues are going to
have on American business, on global business, and on the domestic and
international legal regimes that we're going to have to develop for those
businesses to operate within.
These are issues being debated already, of course, in the interna-
tional arena by legal commentators, by legislators, or the policymakers,
by organizations like WIPO, and IP rights holders, and of course, by the
end users of the products as well. There's a long list of stakeholders in
this debate and they're a diverse group. They have a lot of different in-
terests, and they often have conflicting goals and objectives at stake as
well. What that means, of course, is that the international legal issues
that we are going to face in the digital environment will indeed be very,
very difficult to resolve.
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Now, we often talk about globalization, and we talk about the global
economy in which we all live, operate, and work today. Fifteen years ago
when I was a new professor, business schools were very much focused
on what they called "internationalizing" their curriculum. They wanted
to prepare these future business managers for this global phenomenon
that everybody knew was coming.
Well, today, internationalization doesn't even really show up in the
debates that we have. It's not really on the radar screen of the business
schools anymore because we think globalization has occurred; it's inher-
ent within business activity today, and it's inherent and embedded across
the business curriculum as well, and I think that's the point that we need
to get to as lawyers.
Digital copyright issues, I think, are globalization taken to the nth
degree. Digital copyright is borderless. It's ubiquitous. It's difficult to
regulate (if you can regulate it at all). Yet these digital products are also a
tremendous source for growth in capital. They're tremendous magnets
for creating new wealth, new opportunities, new types of businesses that
we can't yet fathom.
So we need to figure out a way of getting copyright law to the same
place that business education has reached: where internationalization is
so inherent it can go virtually unspoken; where it's so embedded and so
inherent in how we talk about these issues that you don't need to focus
on it anymore as a specific topic; where it's automatically part of the
dialogue whenever we talk about these things.
Now, I think there are a number of systemic reasons why we have
not yet reached internationalization in digital copyright law, and why it
may never even fully occur. And it's interesting, the debate I get among
my students within the classroom, since they approach this topic from so
many different perspectives.
There is this fundamental tension in the international digital copy-
right area. A conflict, on the one hand, which leads some people to think,
well, the internet is a mechanism for the free sharing of information
unless we're told better; and on the other hand, those people who say,
well, the internet is just one more mechanism in a whole host of tools
that we have for disseminating authorized information to authorized in-
dividuals-usually, of course, for a price.
In the international sphere, I think those differences-that conflict-
gets magnified because you do have these different kinds of social and
economic, political and legal differences all coming to the fore. It's hard
to sort out what the ramifications of those differences actually mean to
countries with weaker notions of private property rights, especially IP
rights. Would they favor digital copyright as well? Would content pro-
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viders continue to innovate and create if they faced less legal protection
or would we see a decrease in their creative output-which I think none
of us would want to actually see. Conversely, would a weaker interna-
tional digital copyright system actually promote creativity and decrease
inappropriate types of monopoly?
I would confess I personally believe in a very strong private property
rights regime, and I think that Hernando DeSoto and researchers who
have followed him have done an admirable job of showing that a strong
private property rights regime in real and personal property can indeed
support the growth of capitalism and development of wealth by even the
poorest members of society. What I think we need to figure out is, are
digital products somehow different than traditional property interests?
Would weakened property rights in them actually foster more growth or
would they actually inhibit growth? It's hard to say.
I think the opportunities for empirical research in this field are limit-
less to try to tease out some of these potential consequences. I think until
we look at some of that work and do some of that empirical research,
any of our efforts to try to legislate in this area are necessarily going to
be fumblings in the dark. We can't really be sure of the effects we'll have
until we know how the system views those products.
There's also, of course, the issue of IP rights in the digital environ-
ment just being very different and more complex than IP rights in the
traditional non-digital environment. We've talked about the ease and the
speed of replication today, the difficulty of identifying an infringer, of
halting their activities once you have identified them, of trying to obtain
or enforce a judgment. All of these types of things are multiplied in the
international environment.
We've talked a little bit today about the fact that technology is
probably not the solution, that as fast as we can develop technology to
try to protect digital products, hackers-or whatever term you would
prefer to use for those people if that's now a pejorative term-are behind
us, right behind us, working as fast as we develop the technology to de-
velop ways to get around that technology. The other mechanism that we
have, of course, is the law. But in the international digital copyright con-
text, the law is not a simple solution. Even just the logistics of trying to
enforce your rights in the digital world can be overwhelming. Just think
of the complexities that are involved and the inherent global reach of the
internet.
If you think about, if you're a rights holder in the global digital envi-
ronment, how do you protect your copyrighted products? How do you
identify your infringer? Once you do identify your infringer, what coun-
try's law is applied? Who has jurisdiction? How are you going to deal
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with things like forum shopping? Can you enforce a judgment abroad?
All of those things are very, very complex issues. To a large extent, your
ability to protect your property-your digital product property-is going
to depend upon the efficacy of those national laws that you face in those
countries in which you operate.
Of course, there's the other side of the coin, which is if you're oper-
ating in the digital environment, how do you make sure you're not
subject to the laws of other countries, which you either might not know
or might find unfavorable? Once your product is out there on the inter-
net, of course, you can't control where the reach extends, or the
countries in which you are subjecting yourself to jurisdiction.
So, as I tell my students, it really doesn't matter whether you are the
plaintiff or the defendant in these disputes. Either way, there's just inher-
ent tension out there between the traditional, territorial approach of IP
law versus the international or even stateless nature of the digital envi-
ronment.
So the question, of course, then becomes, what do we do? How do
we create a playing field where the rules of engagement are clear and
fair, and they're easily applied even in this very complex world that digi-
tal copyright creates?
Now, of course, as we talked about today, here in the United States
we've already been pretty active in that area. We've got our DMCA that
creates this very broad range of legal protections for digital copyright
holders. Some would say it's too broad. Some say it's ineffective at what
it attempts to do, but nonetheless we've got it out there.
And we also, I think as Michael alluded to, we have been pretty dili-
gent about trying to export our view of the perfect digital copyright
regime to the rest of the world as well. We can and we do, encourage or
pressure, depending upon your view, our trading partners to adopt U.S.
IP rules, including with respect to digital copyright protection. We're
pretty unrepentant about what we're doing. The acting general counsel
for the U.S. trade representative recently said, "The rules we apply
around the world are the rules that are needed throughout the world."
Well, that works as long as we're the 800 pound economic gorilla in the
room, which we currently are.
Our trading partners today may well gain by adopting the US stan-
dards because it might give them more access to foreign trade and
foreign investment, but I think we need to recall that our IP system is
unique. Few other countries have our system of very strong IP rights
coupled with really extremely weak IP responsibilities. We've got a legal
regime, here, where copyright protection extends for seventy years past
the life of the author and compulsory licensing is a dirty word. Where
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courts offer very extensive enforcement protection for IP rights, with the
enforcement power and legitimacy to make those things stick.
But can we or should we really expect countries with a different
world view, a different view of IP rights, and different judicial back-
grounds to adopt similar schemes? Will the international harmonization
of digital copyright law require changes in our own legal regime as well?
As the global economy changes-(and it is changing)-and non-
western participants like China and India play a larger and larger role,
we're going to increasingly hear voices that will come from very differ-
ent cultural, political, economic, legal and social backgrounds. And their
views of how digital copyright issues, or even IP in-general, should be
managed are likely to be very different from our own.
I think we need to ask ourselves, how willing are we to be open to
dialogue on these issues and to new approaches to these ideas and
rights? How well will we flourish in the new global economy if we re-
fuse to participate in this new dialogue that is inevitable? It will come.
I think to a very large extent, digital copyright creates issues of in-
ternational and political economy-not just law. And as non-western
nations start to play a larger and larger role in that global economy and
they have a louder voice in setting international policy and standards, we
here in the west need to think very carefully about what it is we value
what it is that we're trying to protect-and what mechanisms we can
effectively use to reach those goals.
Now something great about being a professor: You can ask ques-
tions, but you don't necessarily have to have the answers! I'm going to
stop right there.
RICHARD OWENS: Well, the table may be turned on you, Lynda,
when this is over.
[Audience laughter]
MICHAEL W. CARROLL: All right. So, I'm going to put my
Creative Commons hat on in a minute, but I'm going to keep my Villa-
nova hat on for the moment. I have the challenging job of keeping you
awake. I see a lot of you struggling with this.
A couple of points in my professorial capacity that I want to make.
One is the premise of today's discussion: is that law matters and, in par-
ticular, copyright law matters. But we should think about what we have
heard today and ask, Does it really? There are two ways in which copy-
right law might not matter. One is that a DRM regime combined with a
licensing regime could render the copyright entitlement irrelevant. We've
heard from the technology panel that, in fact, the effective combination of
these regimes is a false hope. So law might matter, but we've also heard
that law is irrelevant if the behavior you're worried about is peer-to-peer
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file sharing. (the behavior which gave rise to the Grokster case). That
behavior will not stop no matter what the law is, whether it's standard-
ized or tailored by jurisdiction.
But law will matter when used against people who create businesses
around technologies that facilitate the communication of copyrighted
works across this global network. So then we should care about legal
entitlements, at least, but we should focus on the likely defendants, the
likely folks against whom these entitlements will be used. And we have
heard essentially two competing visions of how this entitlement should
be shared.
One is that standardization and uniformity is what we need because
the internet is a global medium. But that means that, as Professor
Oswald closed with, it might not be so easy. The U.S. should be careful
for what it wishes. Professor Geist says there's an easy way out of that,
and it's through a laboratory approach -with multiple jurisdictions ex-
perimenting with different entitlement designs based on local conditions.
I think I'm with him on the entitlement design question. But the push for
standardization, the demand for standardization in intellectual property
law is strong.
I am now putting on my Creative Commons hat, and I'm going to
talk a little bit about a standardization effort that I've been involved in.
So let me just ask how many people in the room have heard of Creative
Commons? All right. Good. So there are at least a few who haven't, but
it's grown. That's good.
So Creative Commons is an organization that does a number of
things, but primarily what we do is create and distribute free copyright
licenses that are standardized across the jurisdictions of the world. These
licenses essentially flip the presumptions of copyright law. So I want to
close, actually, on the alternative side of the panel.
The whole discussion's been premised on how people use the copy-
right system to enforce their rights in order to extract a profit. The
control granted by copyright law is premised on the need for economic
incentives to create, but, as Professor Reese has suggested, once you get
into a world of automatic copyright, you've now lumped together differ-
ent kinds of copyright owners with different kinds of interests. Some of
them have a much stronger interest in having their work shared than in
controlling how it's used and in obtaining a royalty from such use. And
that's the premise behind Creative Commons. Set up royalty-free uses
that go above and beyond fair-use that you permit, and express it in sim-
ple terms that people can understand.
So in December 2002, we set these licenses loose on the 'Net and
had very little idea of what the uptake would be. But our vision of how
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creativity works suggests that there should be a population out there that
would be more interested in sharing their works over the network than in
controlling distribution.
We don't have a perfect way to measure how many licensed objects
there are but, at last measure, there were fifty-eight million objects on
the web that link back to one of these licenses. And the number keeps
growing at a rapid pace.
Briefly, what you do is, if you have a web page or something on the
web, you answer a couple of questions about what conditions you want
to put on the uses you are willing to allow. Are you willing to allow
commercial use or not? Are you willing to let people modify your work
or not? And then what jurisdiction are you in? Right? Because copyright
law is territorial.
And so what we've had to do is translate the legal code of the li-
censes to comport with the language and the law of all of these different
countries, and we have a number of projects ongoing in a number of ju-
risdictions that are reflected on the screen. So part of the Creative
Commons response is that this is not limited to a U.S. perspective. This
is not a U.S. problem. This is a global response to global copyright, and
there's demand for having creative works shared.
Some of the interesting applications of the licenses include Flickr.
Flickr is a website that will host your digital photos. Flickr's Creative
Commons search engine, which sorts photos by license type, is evidence
for my argument that copyright status is a new relevant dimension to
measure things that you find on the web. We started dealing with the web
in terms of topical relevance. You went to the search engine and said
show me information that's relevant to the subject matter that I'm
searching for. But that doesn't tell you anything about what you can or
can't do with the objects that you find, right?
So now copyright becomes a new relevance dimension. I don't just
want something that's topically relevant, I want something that I can use
for a specific purpose. So if I'm a teacher looking to create a PowerPoint
slide that I'm going to put up on the web, I want a nice background-
and I'm tired of Microsoft's Powerpoint templates. I might go to a web-
site like Flickr and say, well, maybe somebody's done some photos of
abstract kinds of things and I'll use that as my background. Well, will I
have permission? Do I have to negotiate? No. If I choose something un-
der this Creative Commons Attribution license, all I have to do is give
this person credit. They've already given me permission to use their
photo. They've said go for it, just give me credit. So the transaction cost
for that transaction dropped to almost zero, and to the copyright owner
it's great that the photo will be shared.
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So the presumption that the international and alternative discussion
is supposed to be just about enforcement, I think, is too narrow. I think
we're in a world where the Net is not only being used for copyright in-
fringement, but also for licensed or authorized sharing of copyrighted
works-and this is just one use case.
Now these are licenses, and they are legally enforceable agreements.
Just recently, Adam Curry, a former MTV DJ who now podcasts, hosted
some of his photos of his 15-year-old daughter up on Flickr under a
Creative Commons license. A Dutch newsweekly printed one of these
pictures for commercial use, but the photo was under a Creative Com-
mons non-commercial license. Curry has sued successfully in a Dutch
court and enforced the non-commercial restriction of the license.
Separately, there's been an issue with musicians trying to share their
music under Creative Commons licenses, but being told by European
collecting societies that you must assign your copyrights to us. You can't
have it both ways. If you want to get paid for your music being played in
bars and on the radio, you've got to license all of your music to us and
you can't choose to hold some back and share it under a Creative Com-
mons license.
A Spanish court just this week disagreed with that. A bar was play-
ing only music available under a Creative Commons license. It was not
paying the collecting society any money. The bar was sued by the col-
lecting society and the court said, no, your claim is based on
unauthorized performance of music. This is authorized by the copyright
owner, and therefore, there's no infringement here.
So there's an alternative copyright economy growing up, and the
Creative Commons phenomenon is just an example of it. I think it's big-
ger than this. Yahoo! just bought Flickr. Right? Yahoo! had a business
model and Yahoo!'s a global media company competing and trying to
figure out how to make money as digital video and other forms of media
become more and more popular. Yahoo!'s initial bet was we're going to
be the platform for professionally created video content. We are going to
be the extension of the television networks. We're going to be the video
broadcasting platform, and they brought in the network executives to
help develop this professional media platform.
After having bought Flickr, the culture of Flickr basically infected
the culture of Yahoo! I'd say. As the young senior executives started to
see the power of what they call user-generated content (what other peo-
ple refer to as social media), they've changed their bet and have now bet
that this is the future of where you're going to make money at least in an
ad-supported business model on the Net.
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This is the big year for copyright owners. It's not just peer-to-peer
file sharing. It's competition from amateur-created content against pro-
fessionally-created content. So when we talk about alternatives and
enforcement regimes, that's within one version of the copyright model,
but there's an alternative copyright model that's emerging on the Net.
Creative Commons licenses are part of the infrastructure for that model
as well as websites like Our Media or YouTube. Digital video is the next
big thing.
I want to close by going back to peer-to-peer. If digital video is the
next big thing, and there's a market for user-created content, there's a
problem. Digital video is expensive to host and to transmit. The band-
width is an order of magnitude above what is required for music files
even after it's compressed.
In Creative Commons' submissions to the Court in Grokster, we
tried to make this point. We tried to say the user-created copyright envi-
ronment is going to need technologies like BitTorrent. It's going to need
technologies to distribute the load allowing users to share and participate
in the ecology, and copyright rules that make those technologies illegal
make this form of social media in the video context very hard to sustain,
Now that may be part of the strategy of the professional media con-
tent owners to use those rules to undermine this competitive ecology, but
I think from the Creative Commons' perspective, it's essential that when
they create the copyright regime, leave space for this alternative relation-
ship with copyright. And it's always been the Creative Commons'
position that these two uses of copyright are not mutually exclusive. In
fact, we would anticipate that professionally-created content would sur-
vive-thrive in fact--on the internet and co-exist with the social media
universe, which is an underappreciated and growing phenomenon.
We started with music, so I want to close with music. Some MIT
students started, as a project, a piece of open source software that we
helped finish developing at a site called CC Mixter. The idea is you can
go on this website, you can post samples. So if you have a great voice,
nothing else, just sing the melody. Digitally record it. Put it out there,
and say put this in your mash up. Do something with this. And a com-
munity of re-mixers has emerged out of this.
On the screen, is the South African version of Mixter. We now have a
contest. I don't know if you've heard of the band Linkin Park? Well, they
have a side project called Fort Minor. Fort Minor actually has a hit called
"Remember My Name," and for those of you who watch the NCAA on
ESPN, that's the tune you hear. Right? Well, Fort Minor, Warner Brothers,
and Arista agreed to license "Remember My Name," for mixing and
mashing up on CC Mixter, and so we're now having a contest that just
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started. So they've taken apart the pieces of the song and you can remix
it any way you like.
So we talked earlier about filtering. How you might implement a fil-
tering regime, right. You're supposed to look for a file name called
"Remember My Name," and now you will find that CC Mixter hosts a
file called "Remember My Name Latin Version," which is an authorized
Creative Commons licensed remix. But if the filter says that's an illegal
song, then there's a problem. Right?
So the large copyright holders are beginning to participate in the
user-generated, the social media universe, and I think this complicates
some of the questions you talked about, but at this point I'm going to
hear what you say. You've been very patient. I appreciate it very much,
and would like to hear questions. Thanks.
RICHARD OWENS: Thanks. So we have indeed reached the op-
portunity to turn the tables on all of our panelists, not just Professor
Oswald. If there are questions in the audience, please let's hear them.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Could you touch on the politics of piracy
in Sweden with Pirate Bay?
MICHAEL GEIST: I'd say I can't. Any of you know anything
about it?
LYNDA OSWALD: No.
MICHAEL GEIST: Well, no. Pirate Bay was like a BitTorrent
node.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: A tracker.
MICHAEL GEIST: Tracker? Okay. They have faced regular take-
down notifications, yet they post all the various claims and say ha, ha,
ha.
[Audience laughter]
Swedish copyright law so far hasn't done much about it. I think that
reflects in parts of my comments today. Countries want to make choices.
There are those that would argue that a U.S. approach that exports U.S.
copyright law to other countries is a perfectly rational thing to do given
that it may lead to a net economic gain, though we can argue as to
whether or not that's true given what we've just seen about the amount
of content that is created that doesn't rely on copyright incentives. But
certainly from a Canadian perspective and perhaps from a Swedish per-
spective and many other countries, the reality is that we're net importers
of culture. If you're a net importer of culture creating ever-stronger rules
then you are likely to lead to more dollars being sent out of your country.
What you're mainly concerned with is ensuring that you've got a vi-
brant national cultural policy where you want to ensure that your own
artists get airtime. We have Canadian content rules for radio, for televi-
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sion, and there's lots of countries just like it. Why? Because we're aw-
fully close, as you just heard, to the United States. If we didn't have
some of those rules, we would only get U.S. content, very little Canadian
content because the economics wouldn't make any sense.
This arises in the context of the IP choices that you make as well.
Where if you make an IP choice that mirrors the U.S. approach, you've
got to recognize that the economic impact may be a negative for your
country at least with respect to royalty distributions. Although, of course,
if it's traded for something else, that should make generally a benefit
which is what we see happening in a lot of the other countries who are
willing to enter into trade deals with the United States.
RICHARD OWENS: Yeah, but just one quick point on that. A net
difference in intellectual property trade at any given point in time will
only be sustained if levels of protection do not increase in the nation in
deficit, and so forever ensure that it will be a net deficit in intellectual
property trade. Right?
Without encouraging local creation, you're not being able to redress
that imbalance. So it's also a part of the national division policy to try to
redress the imbalance by copyright?
MICHAEL GEIST: No. Actually, a lot of countries can encourage
the creation of national culture without buying into the notion that it's IP
rights, stronger IP rights, that actually accomplishes that. You can, for
example, ensure that smaller Canadian artists get more air time if there
are incentives from radio stations to give more air time. You could take
the money that would otherwise be transferred out and literally just hand
it to the artist, if you like.
There's lots of different cultural choices that you can make that I
don't think necessarily include stronger IP rights, but of course, that
could be one. I think the kinds of examples that we're seeing with Crea-
tive Commons and others actually suggest that it is one of the least
effective in terms of creating more cultural interaction.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It seems to me that international IP trea-
ties are not a new phenomenon. I was wondering how much you could
address whether there is really a matter of new media, and how much it's
a matter of increasing the strength of U.S. copyright laws-thus becom-
ing a driver for other countries touched on this with trade treaties to
support economic pressure. But the thing that made me think of this was
Charles Dickens and that he talked about international piracy rights, and
so it's been around for a while.
MICHAEL GEIST: Well, it has been. The U.S. domestic strategy
of using both bilateral trade treaties as a way of upping the ante is a rela-
tively new phenomenon. One way to test that is to go to the U.S. Trade
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Representative's website and take a look at the various trade treaties, and
you can see the evolution over time. You can, if you'd like, just read the
Canadian free trade agreement, and you'll find there is very little in there
that has to do with IP. In fact, there's even a provision that Canada in-
sisted on that allowed us to protect our own culture. So culture's actually
exempt from the trade treaty and the U.S. was willing to agree to that at
that point in time.
Over time we began to see a shift. It happened in two ways. One, it
happened at the international level and of course Pam's written about
this, how there was an attempt to get DMCA-style legislation within the
U.S. which proved unsuccessful. Instead, the U.S. went to WIPO, ob-
tained the WIPO treaties, and brought it back to the United States, with
new "international obligations" to fulfill.
And at the same time have a parallel trap at a domestic level where
when you're entering into these kinds of negotiations, it increased the
kind of pressure the countries are facing. Peter Drahos from Australia
has written a lot about this.
MICHAEL W. CARROLL: The question refers to the history of
"international piracy." If we define piracy as conduct that is illegal rather
than something that's considered objectionable. The behavior Dickens
was concerned about in the nineteenth century was not illegal at the time
he was writing. In the United States, as we've heard, it was all about the
political autonomy, and we were a net importer of intellectual property
from England and he was an artist not protected under U.S. copyright
law. It was not illegal to print a Dickens novel and not pay him a dime.
There was a "Gentleman's Agreement" among the publishers in or-
der to get first dibs on a manuscript to pay some English authors, but
Dickens, and then later, Gilbert and Sullivan, protested. In the 19th Cen-
tury, the United States saw a series of repeated visits by high profile
British artists saying to Congress, we want protection, we want interna-
tional protection. And the U.S. resisted it until the end of the 19th
Century.
So if complying with domestic law is piracy, then the United States
was a pirate nation until the end of the 19th Century, but eventually we
became a net exporter and the United States government has been push-
ing for stronger and stronger protection. The account that's worth
reading is Information Feudalism by Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite,
a wonderful telling of the story of how TRIPs-how the conceptual
framework behind TRIPs was fashioned, and then the political moves for
pushing that out.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I have a two-part question for Professor
Carroll, primarily. I just find the Creative Commons to be fascinating,
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and one of the areas that you focused on in your talk is about music. And
the specific question that I have pertains to these multiplayer online
games. So for those of you who haven't seen this, it's just really interest-
ing if you go to the game Second Life. There's this digital
characterization of Lawrence Lessing who's involved, obviously, with
the Creative Commons, and it's a remarkable likeness of him, and the
likeness is basically him entering this online world and providing a lec-
ture about copyright and the licenses to the users within the game, which
I just thought that was really cool.
So my two-part question is number one: is Second Life a true excep-
tion? Are there game developers coming to you being interested in
tapping into user generated content or social media, whichever way you
choose to phrase it? And the second one is: to what extent does this also
put you in a quasi-regulatory role in that your colleague, Mia Garlick,
has written about gainers feeling entitled to content even when they ac-
tually don't have the legal rights to the derivative works based on the
individual licenses? So to what extent do you actually serve a monitoring
role about what gets offered for license through a Creative Commons
site?
MICHAEL W. CARROLL: So let me take the second question
first. We don't take any enforcement role, and we're not parties to the
license. We've created the standardized license, but the licensor adopts
that and says, "This is my license. These are the terms that I'm offering
my copyrighted work under," and it's up to the licensor to enforce that
license.
Our role is to provide the words and three ways to represent those
words that we call the legal code, which is the formal license, the hu-
man-readable deed, which is sort of a description of the key terms, and
then a machine-readable layer that identifies which license is attached to
a digital object. We've just sort of created a standardized tool that they
can use.
In terms of the online gaming industry, the issue is that copyright is
so easy to attach. The minimal level of creativity required by copyright
law is quite low, and in these interactive online environments where
you're allowed to manipulate the media and create new derivative works,
a copyright automatically attaches to those and then it becomes a legal
issue of what is the legal status of that and how can it be shared. Second
Life, I think, has been a leader in recognizing and making those re-
sources open to other users who create greater value in the game and so
those are offered under Creative Commons license. So that if you're in
the game, what you create is part of the environment.
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We have not been approached as far as I know. Mia would be better
it seems to answer that. But for game companies, it's a business model
choice whether the user-generated aspects of the game create enhanced
value which should be open resources within that environment or
whether you're going to have some form of control over the game re-
sources, tight control.
RICHARD OWENS: While the next question is brewing, let me
ask a quick one of Professor Oswald if I may. You suggested that there's
room for a lot of empirical research. I'm wondering in which questions
you might be most interested in terms of looking to see if IP regimes
exist and also whether or not the uniformity and globalization kind of IP
regimes might benefit the multi-jurisdictional laboratory effect that
Michael Geist referred to.
LYNDA OSWALD: I'm sorry. What was the last part of your ques-
tion there?
RICHARD OWENS: Sorry. The last part of the question is just
whether, in the efficiencies of uniformity across nations we may not be
foregoing, when different nations take different approaches, the benefits
of additional opportunities for empirical observations arising from the
disparity of conditions.
LYNDA OSWALD: In answer to the first part, I personally would
undertake no empirical studies. I'm a lawyer and the fact of the matter is
I'm not good at empirical studies. My business school colleagues trained
in quantitative disciplines are good at empirical studies; they have the
background necessary to do that. And I myself, while I can see issues I
think are interesting, could never conduct that study. I wouldn't attempt
to do so because it wouldn't be legitimate at the end of the day.
Which is not to say I don't think those empirical studies are impor-
tant to do because I think we tend to look at these issues in IP from our
own narrow perspectives. That's the perspective we have in the west, and
we can't assume that other countries, people with other perspectives, will
react the same way to changes in the law that we might expect we would
react, and I think it's worth exploring what the effects of some of those
changes might be.
But with respect to your second question, I do think Michael's idea
of a laboratory of entitlements is a good idea because I don't think we
can assume up front we know what the best international standard is. I
don't even think we can assume that ultimately there'll be a single inter-
national standard. It might well be that we do need different standards
around the world to accommodate different types of perspectives.
What I think that we will see, though, is that businesses, rights hold-
ers, and rights users are going to push for more standardization. My
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business students don't talk anymore in terms of American business.
They don't know what that means because they're looking at a company
which might be incorporated here in the United States, but might be well
getting its supplies from Canada, it might have its assembly done in
Mexico, might have its call-center and its back offices in India. They
recognize that indeed it is a worldwide web of business as well as a
worldwide web of the internet itself. And that's true of hard assets as
well as digital assets.
When I talk to business executives, they're not so concerned really
about what the standards are as they are about whether the standards are
predictable and clear. They don't expect complete certainty in the system
but they want predictability.
I think Fred raised this earlier. Managers know if they send all of
their tech information, for example, to a call-center in India, there's a
risk associated with that. They're giving up valuable information. How is
that information protected? Will it be protected? If it gets out, how can
they enforce their rights against those who might have misappropriated it
in some way? Those issues are very real to them, and I think what we
will see are people pushing for a clearer playing field. Whether the stan-
dard is the same internationally is a different question. Whether it should
be the same is a different question as well.
I don't think we'll ever get true harmonization. I just never see that
happening, but I think we're moving in that direction, and I think that
can be a very positive thing in terms of certainty and predictability in
business relationships.
RICHARD OWENS: Any other questions?
MICHAEL GEIST: I actually thought we did have international
standards called Berne and TRIPs. There are an assortment of interna-
tional agreements that have been around for a very long time that do
create minimum standards. Richard says you need this kind of legisla-
tion for Creative Commons. I took a look at all the flags that Michael
displayed, and there were lots of countries there that allegedly don't have
certain copyright rules, and certainly don't have anti-circumvention leg-
islation.
So I don't think Creative Commons relies on it and frankly, I don't
think that there's a great deal of business relying on it either. We have
certainty. What we're talking about when we talk about the push at a bi-
lateral level for WIPO-like standards and the WIPO Broadcasting Treaty
Initiative or a whole range of other issues, they're not harmonization.
What they are is a continual ratcheting up at the behest of a fairly small
number of groups. It isn't about harmonization. We all know it's not
about that. It's just about certain groups, Disney in particular, trying to
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extend the life of a copyright for as long as possible, not about any kind
of business certainty, whatsoever.
RICHARD OWENS: Any other questions?
SHARON ARMSTRONG: Thank you. Can we just have a round of
applause for the panelists?
[Applause]
On behalf of our entire Journal, it's been our pleasure to have each
of you in attendance for today's Symposium. I think you'll all agree with
me that it's been an exciting day to hear this incredible group of panel-
ists come debate and discuss the unprecedented changes that are coming
about in copyright law that's succumbing the internet revolution.
It's been our privilege to have the speakers come and to have each of
you come and hear what they had to say. We look forward to seeing you
at the banquet at Campus Inn at 6:30 where we will have dinner and hear
some closing remarks from our keynote speaker, Professor Pamela
Samuelson. Thank you.
[Applause]
